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Crime Victim Compensation in a
Post-9/11 World
Julie Goldscheid"
In tis Article, Professor Goldscheid explores the bamers to economic independence
faced by victims of domesi'c and sexual violence by comparing the government programs for
those victims with the federal September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 created for
victims of the September11 terror attacks, another group of victims systematically impacted by
violence. Professor Goldseheid chromcles and compares the history rationales and underlying
theoies that animate the programs. She argues that the programs contain differen4 but opposite,
flaws. Neither is driven bya coherent theoretical foundation ora methodical analysis ofvictims'
economic realities in the aftermath of the violence. She concludes that the tremendous
differences in program approach are not warranted by the d'fferences in program purpose or
victims 'experience.
Professor Goldscheid argues that future compensation programs for victims of domestic
and sexual violence should maximize cost spreading and should redess the systemic
unavailability of traditional systems ofrecovery She proposes an approach that is grounded in
empiical data describing the reality of victims'expeiances and that eliminates vestiges of bias
against victims of domestic and sexual violence. The approach would generally retain the
modest award structure of the state programs, but would integrate the September 1 1th Victim
Compensation Fund s overall approach to victims, marked by meaningful effots to address their
resulting unmet practical needs, by extensive public education and outreach and by efforts to
encouragepartrcipation and maxiizeprogram utilization. She cautions against the dangers of
developing a two-tiered track of crime vichm compensation programs-one for victims of
terrorism and one for victims of other acts of violence-and identifies risks that such a dual
system would present.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The September 11 terror attacks transformed our social, legal,
philanthropic, and political systems in ways that we can only begin to
predict. For the victims-those who lost family members, homes, or
jobs-the programs established to distribute benefits and resources
were key to their recovery. The philanthropic response was widely
recognized as unparalleled, and the public demanded coordinated,
comprehensive, and accessible services for the victims.' While the
attacks were unprecedented for the United States, the victini assistance
programs that developed in response paralleled longstanding programs
for victims of other violent crimes.2 Nevertheless, they far outstripped
them in scope and government-funded resources. The difference
between the resources directed to victims of the terror attacks and
those directed to victims of other violent crimes raises challenging
questions about the salience of distinctions between terrorism and
other violent crimes, and about the appropriate role of government
compensation in helping victims of violence recover.
1. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
2. See inIfr Parts Ill-IV
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The contrast highlights the vast discrepancy between the
government-supported compensation program created for the
September 11 victims and those available for victims of domestic and
sexual violence, another large group of victims who are systematically
affected by violent crime and who suffer stark economic consequences
as a result. Domestic and sexual violence has been described as
"epidemic" both in the United States and throughout the world? Every
year, over a thousand women are killed in the United States as a result
of domestic violence, accounting for approximately ten percent of all
murders nationwide.! Nearly a quarter of all women surveyed in
government studies report having been raped or physically assaulted
by a current or former intimate partner at some point in their lifetimes
Similarly, in a given year, between 40,000 and 60,000 women are
sexually assaulted.6 A developing body of empirical data documents
the economic toll exacted by domestic and sexual violence, and
describes the many ways in which the violence undermines victims'
economic security.' Yet victims face limited options through which
they can recover for their losses, as the tort system may prove
3. See, e.g., The Problems of Violence Against Women in Utah and Cur-ent
Remedies. Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 1-2 (1993)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (describing violence against women as "epidemic" in hearing
supporting federal Violence Against Women Act); UNIFEM, Not a Minute More: Violence
Against Women Around the Worl4 available at http://www.unifem.org/campaigns/
november25/issue.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (describing violence against women as "a
universal problem of epidemic proportions" based on statistics showing that at least one out
of every three women around the world has been beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise
abused in her lifetime, usually by someone she knows).
4. CALLIE MARIE RENNISTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,
1993-2001, NCJ 197838, at 2 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/ipv01.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (reporting between 1247 and 1600 murders of
women by intimate partners in each year surveyed between 1976 to 2000); CALLIE MARIE
RENNISTON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, NCJ
178247, at 2 (May 2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf (last
visited Oct. 13, 2004) (reporting that intimate partner homicides accounted for approximately
11% of all murders nationwide in 1998).
5. PATRICIA TiADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF
THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, NCJ
183781, at 26 (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/183781.pdf (last
visited Oct. 13, 2003); accord PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
EXTENT, NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE-FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, NCJ 181867, at 9 (July 2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
6. RENNISTON, supra note 4, at I (reporting 41,740 incidents of rape or sexual
assault against women in 2001); RENNISTON & WELCHANS, supra note 4, at 2 (reporting
63,490 incidents of rape or sexual assault against women in 1998).
7. See infia Part VA.
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unavailing and restitution efforts frequently fall short of providing
meaningful recovery.8
To help advance the question of what role government programs
should play in compensating victims of violence, this Article will
compare the government-supported compensation programs available
to victims of domestic and sexual violence with the September 11 th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (9/11 Fund), established by
Congress to assist the victims of the September 11 terror attacks.'" The
9/11 Fund was enacted as part of the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA), which, among other things,
sought to limit the airline industry's liability in the aftermath of the
attacks." The 9/11 Fund authorized those who lost family members in
the attacks and those physically injured as a result of the attacks, to
recover the cost of their losses. Victim compensation through the
8. See infm Part IfVB.5.
9. This Article's use of this abbreviation is for convenience purposes only and
should not confuse the government-sponsored 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund with the
private philanthropic fund established by the United Way and New York Community Trust,
which also was referred to as the "9/11 Fund." That fund, which collected $526 million
(including interest) and distributed over $256 million in cash assistance to victims, was
comprised entirely of private philanthropic funds that provided direct assistance to victims of
the attacks and also funded programs and services to facilitate their recoveries. See The
September 11 Fund, Year Two 15, at http://www.septemberl lfund.org/twoyear_report.pdf
(last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
10. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA), Pub. L. No.
107-42, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note
(West Supp. 2004)). The response to the September 11 attacks also raises difficult questions
about the fairness inherent in providing generous government assistance for victims of those,
but not other, terror attacks, as well as questions about why the government has compensated
victims of terror attacks but not other misfortunes, such as noncriminal torts or natural
disasters. This Article distinguishes compensation for victims of violent crimes from
compensation for victims of other misfortunes on the basis that violent crimes involve acts in
which the state is involved in creating a remedy, in which the loss was committed at the hand
of another person, and for which the tort system tends to be unavailable. See infna Part
IVB.5; see also, e.g., Robert D. Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal
Injury, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 444, 459-61 (1964) (distinguishing the goals of victim compensa-
tion programs from those addressing noncriminal injuries because the losses of those injured
by noncriminal negligent acts are more likely to be covered by the tort system). But see, e.g.,
Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88 VA. L. REv.
1831, 1837-42 (2002) (comparing the 9/11 Fund with tort and no-fault programs); Marshall
S. Shapo, Compensation for Terrorism: What We Are Learning, 53 DEPAuL L. REv. 805, 817
(2004) (suggesting that emotional harm resulting from a terrorist act may be similar to that
resulting from a car accident); Shapo, supra, at 809 (suggesting that terrorism lies on a
continuum that includes illness and injury, natural disaster and war, and even extends to
poverty-notably, violent crimes, of which terrorism is a subset, are absent from his list).
11. ATSSSA § 401 (stating the Act's legislative purpose as "preserv[ing] the
continued viability of the United States air transportation system"); see also infra Part fI.B
(discussing the purpose of the Act).
12. ATSSSA § 403.
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9/11 Fund is premised on the victim's waiver of her rights to sue the
airlines or other related potential tortfeasors. " Thus, the 9/11 Fund is
ostensibly structured as an alternative to the tort system, and awards
are designed to approach what one might recover through a tort
action.14 However, the entire cost of the program is footed by federal
tax dollars, rather than by any actual or alleged wrongdoer.'5 Financial
need plays a role only insofar as it drives the amount of recovery; it is
not considered in eligibility determinations.'6 The program seeks to
maximize participation and has dedicated substantial resources to
providing comprehensive assistance to each claimant.'7 The average
9/11 Fund award to family members was $2 million,'8 and awards to
those injured ranged from $500 to over $8.6 million. 9 The approach
has been described as "extraordinarily generous[], ' 20 notwithstanding
potential claimants' allegations that the program is not generous
enough.2'
Victims of domestic and sexual violence, as well as victims of
other violent crimes, face a very different set of options.22 Every state
13. Id § 405(cX3)(B)(i).
14. See hzfia Part III.
15. But see irila note 177 (referencing arguments positing governmental
responsibility for the attacks).
16. ATSSSA § 405.
17. See hfia notes 162-172 and accompanying text.
18. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR DECEASED VICTIMS: AWARD
PAYMENT STATISTICS, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments-
deceased.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
19. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/paymentsjinjury.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
20. Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle. Collateral
Sowres Under the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 591, 592
(2004).
21. Some victim groups sued the 9/11 Fund, challenging the presumptive awards as
unduly limited, although those claims have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Schneider v.
Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 143-45 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (rejecting claims by surviving
spouses and personal representatives of decedents that the regulatory methods adopted by the
9/11 Fund improperly capped recovery); see also CANTOR FITZGERALD L.P. ET AL.,
SUBMISSION OF CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P., ESPEED, INC. AND TRADESPARK L.P TO THE SPECIAL
MASTER OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 AND TO THE U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, available at http://news.fmdlaw.com/udocs/docs/cantor/cantor902smdojsuo.pdf)
(last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (arguing that the 9/11 Fund's regulations violated Congress' intent
to provide "full compensation" to victims).
22. This Article focuses on victims of domestic and sexual violence, rather than
victims of all violent crime. As Parts IVB.5 and VB, fika, elaborate, victims of domestic and
sexual violence, as well as victims of bias crimes, face particular barriers in obtaining redress
through the criminal and civil justice systems that victims of other crimes do not necessarily
encounter. The specific difficulties domestic and sexual violence victims face in accessing
the tort system, the traditional venue for obtaining compensation for the financial losses that
may result from criminal wrongdoing, make the availability of compensation through public
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operates a victim compensation program that provides short-term
emergency assistance to victims of violent crime.23 These programs
developed in the United States in the 1960s as an outgrowth of the
criminal justice system and out of a concern that the victim was being
unduly ignored in the face of new public commitment of substantial
funds to fight crime." Rather than seeking to approximate the amount
of compensation a victim might recover in tort, these programs provide
modest financial assistance.25 The programs draw on public funding
streams that are financed nearly exclusively by defendant fines and
fees.26 In this way, the term "state" victim compensation programs is a
misnomer, because, unlike the 9/11 Fund, virtually no government
funds are expended to support them.27 In some states, claimants must
establish financial need and will not be eligible if their income and
resources exceed designated amounts. 8 Awards are capped at amounts
averaging $35,000; the average award to victims has remained between
$2000 and $2500 for many years. 9 Minimal funding is available for
program administration and public education."
Of course, differences between the programs readily can be
dismissed as reflective of the myriad ways in which the terror attacks
were unprecedented in scope and effect. Perhaps even more important
is the practical distinction that the 9/11 Fund substitutes for a tort
lawsuit and requires claimants to waive virtually all claims to tort
recovery.3  But on closer inspection, the respective programs are
programs all the more important. Although the principles identified in this paper may apply
as well to other crime victims, the extent to which they apply is beyond the scope of this
Article.






29. LISA NEWMARK ET AL., URBAN INST., THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF STATE
VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT ASSISTANCE AND COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: TRENDS AND
STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE, at xiv (Apr. 2003), athttp://www.urban.org/url.cfin?ID-410924
(last visited Oct. 13, 2004); see also DAN EDDY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIME VICTIMS
COMPENSATION BOARDS, STATE CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: NATURE AND
SCOPE 14, at http://www.ncvc.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (citing an average award
amount of $25,000).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 10602(a)(3) (2000) (capping the amounts that programs
receiving federal funds can use for program administration).
31. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at
49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note (West Supp. 2004)) (requiring claimants to waive their rights to sue
potential tortfeasors); see also infr notes 152-155 and accompanying text. However, the
ATSSSA permits claimants to pursue lawsuits against the terrorists whether or not they filed
claims with the 9/11 Fund. 28 C.ER. § 104.2 1(d) (2003).
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worthy of examination and comparison.32 Victims of terrorism and
victims of domestic violence and sexual assault share much in terms of
the trauma experienced and the resulting financial and practical needs
that often are not covered by other reimbursement sources.3  These
needs include financial assistance, reimbursement for the costs of
shelter and transportation, medical bills, lost wages and funeral
expenses, and counseling to help with shock, grief, loss, and the other
complex emotions associated with violent crimes.3' For example, both
those who lost family members in the terror attacks and those who lose
family members to domestic or sexual violence may require financial
assistance to help replace wages of the deceased on which they were
dependent, counseling to help cope with their loss, and practical
assistance in negotiating a range of needs such as relocation, new
childcare arrangements, and financial planning.5 A careful analysis of
the circumstances victims face demonstrates that systemic factors
prevent both groups from recovering damages through traditional
mechanisms.36 In some senses, a stronger case can be made for
government compensation for victims of domestic and sexual violence
given the historic biases that have prevented those individuals from
obtaining redress through the civil or criminal justice systems. 7 In
addition, empirical data demonstrates the stark economic challenges
victims of domestic and sexual violence face, which may prevent them
from seeking, or obtaining, safety.38 Nevertheless, those two groups
face a dramatically different range of services and benefits depending
on which crime gave rise to their losses.
This Article analyzes both programs in light of their history, the
arguments invoked to support them, and the underlying goals that may
justify compensation programs for victims of violent crime. It argues
that the programs contain different, but opposite, flaws, and that the
32. Michele Landis Dauber has demonstrated that the programmatic response to the
September 11 attacks also parallels compensation programs established in the aftermath of
other disasters, such as compensation programs developed to assist victims of various
calamities, and to assist victims of the War of 1812. See MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE WAR
OF 1812, SEPTEMBER 11TH, AND THE POLITICS OF COMPENSATION (Stanford Law School,
Public Law Working Paper, Dec. 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-=480703 (last
visited Oct. 13, 2004).
33. See infia Part VA.
34. Id.
35. Of course, the same could be said of the survivor of any circumstance involving a
family member who has died. See discussion supra note 10 (distinguishing the groups of
victims addressed in this Article from victims of other misfortunes).
36. See infra Part IVB.
37. See infa Part VB.
38. See infma Part VA.
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tremendous differences in programmatic approach are not justified by
the differences in program purpose or client experience. The 9/11
Fund's structure as a substitute for the tort system, in which
government pays for tort-like awards with no structural incentives to
promote deterrence by the actors who may otherwise have faced
liability, is difficult to justify as a model for future programs.
However, its program directive that victims' needs be taken seriously
correctly respects the difficulties victims of violence face, and makes
serious efforts to address their needs. By contrast, the state victim
compensation programs reflect an innovative approach to
compensation that holds the potential of substantially advancing
victims' resulting financial needs without imposing a huge tax on the
public. However, the virtually complete lack of governmental support
and attendant restrictive program requirements hamper the programs'
ability to fully realize those goals.
Victim compensation is ancillary in both cases: to airline
industry financial security, in the case of the 9/11 Fund, and to the
criminal justice system, in the case of the state compensation
programs. Neither is driven by a coherent theoretical foundation or a
careful analysis of victims' actual needs for compensation based on the
economic concerns and realities associated with the violence. The
state compensation programs go a long way toward maximizing cost-
spreading and meeting crime victims' resulting needs, but they retain
unduly restrictive features that reflect both the minimal resources
authorized for the programs and historic biases about victims. By
contrast, the 9/11 Fund, developed in the absence of historic bias, was
driven by an overwhelming public perception that victims were
"innocent" and "deserving" of comprehensive assistance and support.
In that context, it defined a new standard for what it means to meet
crime victims' needs.
This Article argues in support of what could be considered a
"victim-centered" or "restorative" approach to future compensation
programs. A victim-centered program would retain the modest award
structure of the state programs, but would integrate the 9/11 Fund's
general approach to victims, marked by sufficient resources to enable
the program more fully to address victims' resulting unmet practical
needs, to conduct extensive public education and outreach, and to
undertake substantial efforts to encourage participation and maximize
program utilization. It would be grounded in empirical data about the
challenges victims experience as a result of the violence, and the
economic and structural limitations that often hamper their ability to
[Vol. 79:167
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recover from the violence absent external supports. This Article argues
that an approach that both maximizes cost-spreading and meaningfully
addresses crime victims' resulting financial needs would best advance
victims' interests. Such an approach could be realized within a fiscal
framework that is reasonable for a govemment-supported program.
Extending the 9/11 Fund's compensation structure to victims of future
acts of terrorism risks the creation of a two-tiered approach to
compensation that is not warranted by the differences in the impact of
the violence on the respective victims' lives." However, extending its
fundamental programmatic approach to victims who have survived
trauma from criminal violence other than terror attacks could mark a
substantial positive reform.
This Article lays the foundation for the analytic comparison by
describing the two programs before comparing their approaches, goals,
and implications for the future. Part II describes the state victim
compensation programs, recapping their evolution as part of the "War
on Crime" and the victims' rights movements that took root in the
1960s. Numerous rationales were propounded to support public
funding during the debate that preceded the programs' enactments.
However, the programs ultimately avoided the question of how to
justify public support through a funding structure that leveraged
defendant fines and fees and virtually eliminated public funding.
While this structure undoubtedly facilitated the programs' enactments,
it also produced a modestly resourced program that limited, rather than
encouraged, program participation. The resulting system functioned as
39. Some proposals have been introduced concerning compensation programs for
victims of future terrorist attacks. See, e.g., Benefits for Victims of International Terrorism
Act of 2003, S. 1275, 108th Cong. § 7 (2003) (proposing awarding death benefits
commensurate to those paid under the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program to the
surviving families of those killed in future terrorist attacks and authorizing payments of up to
those amounts to those injured as a result); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural
Design and Terror Victin Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 627, 658-60 (2004) (proposing a
government-provided insurance program that would be based on need, not loss); SAUL
LEVMORE & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURING AGAINST TERRORISM-AND CRIME (Michigan Law
and Economics Research Paper No. 03-005, U. of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No.
47, U. Chicago Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper 189, May 2003), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract-414144 (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (proposing experimentation with crime
insurance to address needs that arise from future acts of terrorism); Anne Gron & Alan 0.
Sykes, Tenrrism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the Government as Insurer, 36 IND. L.
REV. 447, 448 (2003) (arguing against government involvement in insurance markets for
terrorism insurance). None of these proposals addresses the similarities between the
predicaments facing victims of terrorism and victims of domestic and sexual violence or
other violent crimes. Nor do they address the inconsistencies that might arise by virtue of
establishing separate and unequal systems for these two groups of victims. See fia Part V
2004]
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an offshoot of the criminal justice system, rather than one focused on
crime victims' experiences and needs.
Part III addresses the 9/11 Fund, reviewing its legislative history,
program structure and the benefits available for victims. The
program's provision of tort-based awards was driven by its essential
function as part of a financial assistance package for the airline
industry. However, from a compensation perspective, providing
awards approximating tort damages without any accountability by
wrongdoers fails to advance the deterrence goals central to the tort
system. On the other hand, its many programmatic initiatives that take
victim needs seriously merit further consideration. By going to
lengths to encourage participation and meet the victims on their own
terms, the program offers an approach to service that resource-
strapped victim compensation programs cannot provide.
Part IV evaluates and compares the programs. It starts by
comparing the experiences of the victims-analyzing the similarities
of need and the differences in context, and refutes the arguments that
would dismiss the analogy outright. It concludes that there are
sufficient similarities to warrant the comparison. Part IV then
analyzes the primary rationales propounded in support of both
programs. It examines the use of compensation programs as a
substitute for tort actions, as a social welfare program, as a mechanism
through which the risks and costs of crime are spread, and as an
initiative that enhances the effectiveness of the criminal justice system.
It assesses the ways in which these rationales and approaches comport
with several of the goals that can be understood to underlie
compensation systems: corrective justice, distributive justice, and
deterrence. Both programs' limitations reflect the fact that each
evolved as part of systems with primary goals other than providing
appropriate compensation to victims, and are not based in a theory that
makes the economic impact of violence on victims' lives central.
When these realities are considered, the "tort substitute" and
"cost-spreading" approaches emerge as the most promising rationales
for future initiatives. Crime victim compensation programs may be
best conceived as providing a means for recovery in cases in which the
tort system will be systematically unavailable. They will best serve
victims' interest in compensation and society's interest in minimizing
costs if they maximize cost-spreading, which the state programs
accomplish through use of defendants' fines and fees. These fees will
not be sufficient, however, to meet victims' needs, and should not be
the sole source of programmatic support.
[Vol. 79:167
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Part V identifies two issues that emerge from this analysis that
should be taken into account in the future. First, empirical data about
victims' access to and ongoing unmet needs for compensation supports
expanding the state programs' eligibility criteria, and enhancing public
education and outreach. This empirical data, grounded in victim
experience, should provide a foundation for program development.
Second, the disparate approaches represented by the two programs
accentuate historic and enduring bias against victims of domestic and
sexual violence. This bias continues to hamper victims' ability to seek
redress through the criminal and civil justice systems, including their
ability to recover for the financial losses that result. The September 11
attacks and the compensation programs that developed for the victims
of that act of large-scale violence illuminate the unnecessarily
restrictive requirements that continue to limit those seeking
compensation through the state programs. The Article concludes by
cautioning against the development of separate programs for victims
of crime and victims of terrorism, and urges a broader approach that
acknowledges the challenges and realities victims face as they seek to
recover from violence.
II. STATE CRIME VICTIM PROGRAMS
Victims of domestic and sexual violence seeking compensation
from government programs can attempt to recover their financial
losses through restitution or through state victim compensation
programs. This Part first briefly describes restitution, including its
history, current status, and its promise and limitations as a source of
compensation for victims. It then addresses the related but distinct
evolution of state victim compensation programs.4" Both emerged
from and are ancillary to the criminal justice system. As such, they
each are limited in the relief they offer to victims.
A. Restitution
Systems of restitution, in which the perpetrator compensates the
victim for her losses, have taken various forms since ancient times."
40. Professor Stephen Schafer, one of the leading proponents of restitution and crime
victim compensation programs, has described the difference in that compensation is a civil,
social welfare program reflecting a responsibility for the victim assumed by society while
restitution is penal in nature and allocates responsibility to the offender. Stephen Schafer,
Victim Compensation andResponsibility, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 55, 65 (1970).
41. The familiar notion of "an eye for an eye," dating back to the Code of
Hammurabi in the eighteenth century B.C., is perhaps one of the earliest references to
2004] 177
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As governments assumed increasing responsibility for prosecuting
crime and as crimes were viewed as committed against the state, not
the victim, fees and penalties imposed on defendants increasingly were
paid to the state rather than the victim, and victims could recover
damages only through special civil tribunals.42 The United States
became interested in restitution in the 1930s, as interest in reforming
the criminal justice system and addressing victims' resulting needs
grew. 3 Arguments that restitution could have a corrective effect on the
offender helped support the development of restitution systems."
Some states began to enact penal laws permitting restitution as part of
suspended sentences and probation.
Federal funding for restitution programs first became available in
the 1970s.6 In 1982, Congress enacted the Victim and Witness
Protection Act.47  That law required federal judges to order full
payments to victims as a form of punishment. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD: VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: RESTITUTION, NCJ 170600, at 355 (1998) [hereinafter OVC RESTITUTION],
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/new/directions/welcome.htmI (last visited Oct. 13,
2003); see also, e.g., L.T. Hobhouse, Law and Justice, in CONSIDERING THE VICTIM 5 (Joe
Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1975) (detailing the history of restitution); Richard E. Laster,
Criminal Restitution: A Survey ofits Past Hstory, in CONSIDERING THE VICTIM, sup/a, at 19,
19-22 (same); Schafer, supra note 40, at 55-56 (discussing the historical origins of
compensation and restitution); Childres, supra note 10, at 444-55 (same). Historians have
documented the evolution of criminal punishment from schemes in which individuals had
license to take the law into their own hands and exact punishment on their own terms, to
systems of "composition," in which payment to the victim was introduced as a means to settle
accounts between victims and perpetrators following a crime. See Hobhouse, supra at 5-7;
Leonard McGee, Crime Victim Compensation, 5 J. CONTEMP. L. 67, 68 (1978) (tracing the
origins of compensation as a means of restoring a productive person to society and promoting
productivity, rather than revenge); STEPHEN SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION TO
VICTIMS OF CRIME 3-7 (2d ed. 1970). The system of composition was dependent on victim
approval of the amount of compensation, which varied according to the nature of the crime,
and the age, rank, sex, and prestige of the injured party. SCHAFER, supra, at 6.
42. SCHAFER, supra note 41, at 139-41. The implications of separating the civil and
criminal justice systems have been widely debated. On the one hand, separating the two
processes leaves the victim with the difficulties of attempting to recover through the civil
justice system. On the other hand, the concern that the victim should not have an interest in
the criminal justice process counseled separating the two systems. See id. at 11-12; McGee,
supra note 41, at 68; Childres, supra note 10, at 445; Laster, supra note 41, at 24; Schafer
supra note 40, at 56.
43. Stephen Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Cnime--An Old Correctional Aim
Modernize4 50 MINN. L. REV. 243,248 (1965-66).
44. Id
45. OVCRESTTUTION, supranote 41, at 355.
46. Id.
47. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248
(1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515, 3663-3664 (2000) and FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)).
2004] VICTIM COMPENSA TIONPOST-9/11
restitution in criminal cases." In 1994, a section of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act made restitution mandatory in
federal convictions for sexual assault or domestic violence offenses, 9
and in 1996, restitution was made mandatory in all cases of federal
violent crime." Restitution orders are enforced by the United States
and treated as final judgments.'
Today, all states have statutes addressing restitution; however they
vary widely in their scope of coverage and the extent to which they are
enforced." Restitution has been recognized as one of the "most under-
enforced victim rights" available through the criminal justice system.3
By contrast, restitution is also one of the most significant factors
affecting victims' satisfaction with the criminal justice process. 4
Restitution is not likely ever to be sufficient to ensure full victim
compensation. First, it is only available in cases in which the
48. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, § 5(a), 96 Stat. at 1253.
49. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40113, 108 Stat. 1796, 1904 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2248).
50. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 204, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(A)).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m), (o).
52. OVC RESTITUTION, supra note 41, at 356. For example, states vary with respect
to whether restitution is mandated in all cases, only in cases involving violent crime, or only
in cases involving property crime. Id. at 356-57. States also vary with respect to the range of
people who can seek restitution: in some states family members, victims' estates, private
entities, victim service agencies, and others can seek assistance as well as the victim. Id. at
357.
53. Id. A 1996 study reported that less than one-half of 1300 crime victims surveyed
were awarded restitution. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ORDERING
RESTITUTION TO THE CRIME VICTIM: LEGAL SERIES #6, at 4, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
ovc/publications/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin6/ncj189189.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004)
[hereinafter OVC LEGAL SERIES] (citing David Beatty, Susan Hawley & Dean Kilpatrick,
Statutory and Constitutional Protections for Victims Rights, National Center for Victims of
Crime 39 tbl. C-8); see also, e.g., Robert C. Davis, Frances Kunreuther & Elizabeth Connick,
Expanding the Victim s Role in the Criminal Court Dispositional Process.- The Results of an
Experimen 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491, 499 (1984) (finding that 84% of victims
who had incurred property loss or medical expenses as a result of crime were not awarded
restitution); OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2002 NATIONAL VICTIM
ASSISTANCE ACADEMY TEXTBOOK: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (2002)
(reporting studies finding between 54% and 81% of total restitution ordered was paid by
offenders), athttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/assist/nvaa2002/chapter5_2.html (last visited Oct.
13, 2004).
54. OVC RESTITUTION, supra note 41, at 357; accordBARnARA E. SMITH, ROBERT C.
DAvIS & SUSAN W WILLENBRAND, AM. BAR ASS'N, IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT OF COURT-
ORDERED RESTITUTION 27 (Aug. 1989) (on file with author) (stating that nearly 50% of crime
victims participating in selected restitution programs reported that award did not cover
losses); Davis, Kunreuther & Connick, supra note 53, at 499 (finding that failure to obtain
restitution was the second most commonly cited reason for victim dissatisfaction with case
outcomes in criminal court).
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perpetrator is apprehended and convicted."5 By definition, then, it is
less useful for victims of domestic and sexual violence, crimes for
which underreporting, underprosecution, and low conviction rates are
notorious. 6  In addition, many restitution statutes only authorize
payment of the victim's out of pocket expenses, not lost future
earnings. 7 Moreover, as commentators addressing restitution in the
context of victim compensation almost uniformly argue, offenders
frequently are unavailable or have inadequate resources." Although
that premise undoubtedly holds merit, it is worthy of critical review.
Offenders of all income levels commit violent crimes, notwithstanding
the higher representation of the poor among victims." As the National
55. Restitution can be awarded in cases that result in a plea agreement as well. OVC
LEGAL SERIES, supra note 53, at 2.
56. Only about half of female victims of intimate violence reported the incident to
law enforcement. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY
INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS,
AND GIRLFRIENDS, NCJ 167237, at 17 (1998), available athttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/vi.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004). Approximately one in three offenders identified by the
victim were eventually arrested or charged for the victimization. Id. at 20.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 768 E2d 790, 802 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.)
(prohibiting lost future earnings in a criminal sentence of restitution if the amount of those
earnings is in question); see also United States v. Bengamina, 699 E Supp. 214, 218-19 (W.D.
Mo. 1988) (following Posner's rationale but acknowledging that future earnings may be an
appropriate component of restitution under certain circumstances). However, some states
authorize restitution payments that include future damages. OVC RESTITUTION, supra note
41, at 369 (citing Iowa and Arizona as states in which restitution can include payment for
future losses).
58. See OVC RESTITUTION, supra note 41, at 357; McGee, supra note 41, at 68.
Defendants who are incarcerated necessarily will be unable to pay due to their absences from
the workforce. See LeRoy L. Lamborn, The Proptiety of Governmental Compensation of
Victims of Crime, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 446, 451-53 (1973); see also David L. Roland,
Progress in the Victim Reform Movement No Longer the "Forgotten Victim," 17 PEPP. L.
REv. 35, 42 (1989) (noting the high percentage of indigent defendants as a drawback to one
use of restitution); Charlene L. Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard Questions and Suggested
Remedies, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 51, 58-59 (1985) (same); Marvin E. Wolfgang, Victim
Compensation in Crimes ofPersonal Violence, 50 MINN. L. REV. 223, 240 (1965-66) (arguing
that the general inability of offenders to make restitution supports government funding of
compensation programs); Kathleen V Duffield, Note, Compensating Victims of Crime:
Evolving Concept or Dying Theory?, 82 W VA. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (1979) (citing offender
insolvency as a reason for the inadequate results achieved by victim compensation programs).
59. For example, studies show that persons with a household income under $50,000
were more likely than those in higher income households to experience sexual assault. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.bjs/cvict-v.
htm#income (last visited Oct. 13, 2004). Similarly, women with lower incomes have been
shown to experience higher rates of domestic violence, although both domestic violence and
sexual assault occur across all class lines. RENNISTON, sUprd note 4, at 4; accordNAT'L INST.
OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BRIEF: WHEN VIOLENCE HITS HOME: How
ECONOMICS AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLAY A ROLE I (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.
org/pdffilesl/nij/205004.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2004) (concluding that intimate violence is
more prevalent and more severe in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods).
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Institute of Justice concluded, improved collection efforts could result
in substantial increases in revenues.6" A more comprehensive approach
to victim compensation might include, though not to be limited to,
increased support for enforcement of the restitution statutes already on
the books in every state.
B Victim Compensaion Progrmms
1. History and Programmatic Evolution
British social reformer Margery Fry is widely credited for
bringing public attention to victims' needs for adequate
compensation." Her newspaper articles in the 1950s and 60s
described the inadequacy of the existing restitution-based system for
compensating victims of violent crime. 2  She brought to light the
paltry sums ordered paid and the improbability of victims receiving
full compensation given the lengthy payment schedules afforded
defendants." Fry's articles were the impetus for public analysis and
debate, which gave rise to a noted public symposium on compensation,
a British government-sponsored study of worldwide restitution
systems, and, subsequently, a British government white paper on
victim compensation, which recommended enactment of a public
program.
New Zealand implemented the first crime victim compensation
program in 1964.65 It authorized compensation for expenses,
pecuniary loss, and pain and suffering resulting from crimes included
on a specifically enumerated list.16 The program was publicly funded,
although the government would attempt to recover amounts paid to the
60. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENSATING CRIME VICTIMS: A
SUMMARY OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES 37 (1992) (on file with author).
61. Lamborn, supm note 58, at 448-49.
62. Margery Fry, Justice for Victims, 8 J. PuB. L. 191, 191-92 (1959). As one glaring
example, Fry discussed a case in which court-ordered restitution would take 442 years to
compensate fully a victim for the losses incurred. Id at 192.
63. Id.
64. McGee, supm note 41, at 69; Lamborn, supa note 58, at 448-49. See generally
HOME OFFICE, COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE (June 1961) [hereinafter
WHITE PAPER] (on file with author).
65. See SCHAFER, supra note 41, at 139. The New Zealand program was enacted
through the "Criminal Injuries Compensation Act," which came into force on January 1,
1964. Id
66. Kent M. Weeks, The New Zealand Criminal Injuies Compensation Scheme, 43
S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 110-11 (1970). The enumerated crimes included violent offenses,
ranging from kidnapping to completed or attempted rape, but excluded compensation for
damage to personal property. Id.
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victim from the offender." Britain's victim compensation program
came into effect very shortly thereafter." Like New Zealand, the
British scheme was to be administered by a board with appointed
members, whose decisions were deemed final.69 Victims could be
compensated for personal injuries resulting from any criminal offense
in which the damages exceeded a threshold amount, the crime was
reported to police without delay, and where the applicant submitted to
a medical examination." The scheme contained several exclusions.
For example, it would not cover maintenance of a child conceived as a
result of rape.7' It also reduced payments in amounts proportional to
the victim's responsibility for the crime, therefore reflecting the notion
that only "innocent" victims could recover." Like New Zealand, the
program was funded by tax dollars, and would not award payments
that would duplicate amounts recovered through the tort or other
systems.73
Reformers in the United States became interested in victim
compensation programs around the same time. In 1964, California
became the first state in the United States to enact a victim
compensation program." Several states quickly followed, and today,
all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands operate
67. SCHAFER, supa note 41, at 141.
68. Britain's program became effective on August 1, 1964. McGee, supra note 41, at
69. Though there was public agitation for a program in England before any such public
support existed in New Zealand, New Zealand adopted its program before Britain. See Ralph
W Yarborough, The Battle for a Federal Violent Cimes Compensation Act." The Genesis of
S. 9, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 93,96 (1970). New Zealand advocated for a compensation program
primarily to stifle opposition to penal reform, which had outraged the citizenry for its alleged
generosity toward criminals. Id.
69. SCHAFER, supranote 41, at 139, 144.
70. Id. at 144.
71. Id
72. Id. at 144-45.
73. Id.
74. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim " Raghts, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937,
944 (1985) (describing the development of victim compensation programs in the context of
the victim's rights movement).
75. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 13950-74 (Deering Supp. 2004); McGee, supra note 41, at
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victim compensation programs.76 Federal funding for these programs
first became available in 1974."
Congress took a major step toward institutionalizing support for
the state programs when it enacted the Victims of Crime Act of 1984
(VOCA),78 after over a decade of debate.79 First introduced in 1972, the
initial proposal would have provided compensation to victims of
federal crimes and grants to the states that then operated qualifying
victim compensation programs." The proposal contemplated
compensating victims for their "net losses," which included costs such
as medical expenses, lost past and future earnings up to a statutorily
capped rate, and associated costs for child care.8' It excluded
compensation for pain and suffering and property loss. 2 The initial
proposals reflect several concerns that continue to animate program
76. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NEW DIRECTIONS FROM
THE FIELD: VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CRIME VICTIM
COMPENSATION, NCJ 170600, at 325 (1998) [hereinafter OVC VICTIM COMPENSATION],
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/new/directions/pdftxt/chapl4.pdf. (last visited Oct.
13, 2004); Smith, supra note 58, at 52-56 (recounting program scope and requirements as of
the mid-1980s).
77. Funding originally was made available through the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration of the Department of Justice, which was terminated in the 1980s. Robert L.
Rabin, The September 1 1th Victim Compensation Fund. A Circumscribed Response or an
Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 769, 796 (2003).
78. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10605 (2000)).
79. The legislation that ultimately was enacted as the 1984 VOCA initially was
introduced in 1973. S. REP. No. 93-83, at 2 (1973). A previous crime victim compensation
statute had been introduced by Senator Yarborough in 1965. See Ralph W Yarborough, S.
2155 of the Eighty-Ninth Congress-The Ciminal Injlues Compensadon Act, 50 MINN. L.
REv. 255, 255 (1965-66). Senator Yarborough modeled his programs on those enacted in
Great Britain and New Zealand. Id. His bill would have provided compensation only for
victims of crimes that arose in the limited arena of federal criminal jurisdiction, based on the
theory that state compensation was warranted only where the state failed to protect the victim
from the crime. Id. at 258. As a result, it could apply only where there was an existing
general federal police responsibility. Id. The scheme would have provided compensation for
physical injury (not property damage) upon a finding that the injury or death resulted from a
criminal act. Id at 263. The proposed legislation would have permitted damages awards that
took into account future losses, and would have authorized the fact-finding commission to
look at all factors, including other sources of recovery, in determining the proper award,
although it set a maximum recovery at $25,000. Id. at 263-64.
80. S. RE. No. 93-83, at 2. The initial criteria resembled the current federal criteria
in requiring prompt reporting to law enforcement and precluding awards to those whose own
conduct was a substantial contributing factor in the crime. Id. at 6. The initial proposal also
established a requirement that victims prove financial need. While explicitly deemed not to
be a "means test:' the legislation employed a concept of "financial stress" so that the
resources of the program would be concentrated in the area of greatest need. Id at 5.
81. Id at 5, 12. Survivors of victims killed as a result of the crime would also be
eligible for reasonable burial expenses and loss of support. Id.
82. Id. at 5.
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requirements and limitations. First, the federal compensation program
would only cover costs that were not covered by other sources.83 In
addition, Congress sought to ensure that the program serve only
"innocent" victims. ' It also required that claimants "cooperate" with
law enforcement authorities in order to receive compensation.85
Similarly, claimants must have promptly reported the crime, unless
they could show good cause for the delays."
Congress cited several rationales in support of the federal
program. A 1976 House Report relied on a governmental "failure to
protect" theory, justifying compensation programs on the theory that
an individual victimized by a criminal attack has suffered both
society's failure to eliminate crime in general and law enforcement's
failure to prevent the particular crime." Congress saw society's duty to
compensate the victim as compounded by its prohibition against the
individual's taking the law into her own hands." Congress also cited
the notion that compensating victims would encourage cooperation
with law enforcement and help reduce the alienation many felt about
83. Id. This remained a central tenet throughout the VOCA Fund's legislative history.
A provision establishing the program's right to recover from the perpetrator was contained in
the 1973 bill. Id. at 19 (discussing section 457 of the 1973 bill, which grants the attorney
general the right to institute an action against any person whose actions gave rise to the claim
for compensation). The 1976 bill explicitly provided that the amount of any state award
would be reduced by any amount the claimant recovered from another source, to establish the
program as the payor of last resort and prevent double recovery. H.R. REP. No. 94-1550, at
10-11 (1976). This provision stayed in the bill in various forms. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-
337, at 3, 8 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-963, at 8-9, 16 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-1762, at 4, 12
(1978); H.R. REP. No. 96-753, at 8 (1980).
84. The legislative history reflects supporters' intent to exclude those who contributed
to the commission of the crime. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96-753, at 3, 6 (1980) (reflecting the
intention to exclude those who contributed to the crime by being accomplices or bearing
some responsibility for the criminal act); H.R. REP. No. 95-337, at 2, 27 (1977) (same); S.
REP. No. 93-83, at 4 (1973) (expressing concern for the lack of support extended to the
"innocent victim" as compared with the protections offered criminal offenders). However,
the term "innocent victim" has been interpreted to preclude recovery to a much wider group
of individuals. See infra notes 116, 132 and accompanying text.
85. This provision also has characterized VOCA since its earliest drafts. See, e.g., S.
REP. No. 93-83, at 17 (requiring the claimant to have "substantially cooperated" with law
enforcement in VOCA of 1973); H.R. REP. No. 94-1550, at 9 (requiring "cooperation" in
VOCA of 1976); H. R. REP. No. 95-337, at 6-7 (VOCA of 1977); S. REP. No. 95-963, at 7
(VOCA of 1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-1762, at 3, 8 (1978) (noting that the Conference Report's
decision to require cooperation, rather than exclude awards for which no cooperation was
proved, was an enforcing requirement that would ease administrative burden).
86. S. REP. No. 93-83, at 16 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 96-753, at 8 (requiring claimants
to report the crimes to law enforcement within seventy-two hours absent proof of "good
cause" in VOCA of 1979).
87. H.R. REP. No. 94-1550, at 5; see also hwa Part IVB. 1.
88. H.R. REP. No. 94-1550, at 5.
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the criminal justice system." Finally, Congress recognized the
pragmatic need for government compensation because other means,
such as insurance, public welfare, charity, and restitution, were
inadequate."0
In 1982, President Reagan appointed a President's Task Force on
Victims of Crime, which issued its Final Report in December of that
year.' Among other things,92 the Task Force recommended that
Congress enact legislation to provide federal funding to assist state
crime victim compensation programs. 3 Significantly, the Final Report
recommended a federal program that would increase criminal
defendants' fines and fees to "ensure a program that is both
administratively efficient and self-sufficient, requiring no funding
from tax revenues." The crime victim compensation legislation
subsequently introduced in Congress incorporated many of the
recommendations from the Final Report.5 Perhaps most important of
these was a provision establishing new penalty assessments and fines,
which were designed to produce an increased revenue stream for the
new program." Accordingly, the 1984 legislation authorized the
deposit of penalty assessment fees and public donations authorized for
89. Id. at 5-6; see also S. REP. No. 95-963, at 13 (letter of then-Assistant Attorney
General Patricia M. Wald) (supporting the victim compensation program (1) to spread the
costs of crime; (2) to demonstrate that government's concern with crime extends beyond
detection, prosecution, and conviction in order to improve the public's attitude to the criminal
justice system and improve quality of urban life; and (3) to encourage citizens to report
offenses to law enforcement); infra Part I.B.3 (discussing victim compensation as an aid to
the criminal justice system).
90. H.R. REP. No. 94-1550, at 6.
91. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 1982)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
92. The Final Report issued a comprehensive series of recommendations, addressing
federal and state governmental initiatives, including: recommendations for criminal justice
system agencies; recommendations for organizations such as hospitals, ministries, the bar,
and schools; recommendations for the mental health community and the private sector; and a
constitutional amendment enhancing crime victims' rights. Id. at v.
93. Id at 37. The Task Force recognized the importance of financial assistance to
victims' abilities to recover from the crime, and recognized the limits of restitution as a source
for funding those programs. It resolved what it saw as the two fundamental issues
surrounding providing federal funding for victim compensation: first, with respect to the
propriety of federal involvement and cost, the Task Force concluded that federal involvement
was appropriate to assist the state programs that compensate federal crime victims without
invoking an entirely new bureaucratic mechanism; and second, to supplement the federal
assistance already provided to state criminal justice systems in the form of grants to prisons
and by recommending a funding scheme that relied primarily on criminal fines, penalties, and
forfeitures. Id. at 44.
94. Id.
95. See S. REP. No. 98-497, at 1-3 (1984).
96. Id. at 13-14.
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the purpose of compensating crime victims, into a fund that would
form the basis of payments to the states for victim compensation and
17assistance programs.
The legislation's stated purposes included addressing the inability
of the then-existing state programs to "adequately protect and assist"
crime victims; a recognition that "successful operation of the criminal
justice system depends on the welcome participation of witnesses" and
an acknowledgement that the states and the federal government share a
joint responsibility for assisting victims of crime." Thus, the
legislation was premised on the theory that the programs would assist
the operation of the criminal justice system and reflected a general
social welfare notion of responsibility for the crime victim." However,
its enactment undoubtedly was facilitated by the fact that the
operational scheme required no expenditure of taxpayer dollars.' 0
2. Program Structure, Benefits, and Requirements
As currently enacted, state victim compensation programs in the
United States reimburse victims of nearly every type of violent crime
for expenses such as medical care, mental health counseling, lost
wages, and, where appropriate, funeral expenses and loss of support,
although specific program benefits and requirements vary from state
to state. 0' In 1996, Congress amended VOCA to authorize
compensation awards to victims of terrorism as well as to victims of
the other qualifying crimes.0 2 Notably, New York's Crime Victim
Compensation Board, the state's victim compensation program, was
among the first programs to make cash assistance available to victims
of the September 11 attacks; compensation programs from other states
played an invaluable role in helping victims as well.' 3
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id at 4; see hfia Parts I.B.2-3.
99. S. REP. No. 98-497, at 1-3.
100. As the Senate Judiciary Committee Report recommending enactment of the bill
stated: "While the bill would authorize new spending, the increased fines, improved
collections, penalty assessment fees, and public donations could conceivably offset much of
that spending authority." Id at 21.
101. OVC VICTIM COMPENSATION, supm note 76, at 1; NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIME VICTIM
CoMp. BDS., CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION: AN OVERVIEW, available at www.nacvcb.org/
articles/Overview_..pm.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
102. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 233(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1244 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10602(d)(3)
(2000)).
103. EDDY, supm note 29, at 16-17. As of September 30, 2003, the New York Crime
Victims Board had provided $44 million in compensation to New York victims of the attacks,
for expenses incurred from emergency assistance, to funeral expenses, loss of
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States with compensation programs that meet legislatively
specified criteria are eligible to receive VOCA matching funds.'"
Recognizing that victims need support services as well as
compensation, VOCA funds victim assistance programs as well.
10 5
One of the most notable and least publicized facts about the VOCA
programs is that virtually no public funds are expended for these
programs; VOCA is funded entirely by federal criminal fines and
penalties.' 6 State expenditures on victim compensation programs also
are funded predominantly by criminal fines and penalties, although a
few states complement those monies with small amounts of general
revenue funds.07 When both federal and state sources are taken into
account, approximately 90% of funding for state victim compensation
programs is derived from offender fines and penalties.' 0 As a result,
funding levels for victim compensation programs vary depending on
the amount of fines collected from defendants in a given year. 
°0
earnings/support, and medical expenses. E-mail from Sue Malatesta, N.Y State Crime
Victims Bd., to Heather Pratt, Research Assistant (Nov. 6, 2003) (on file with author). In
addition to the New York program, state victim compensation programs in Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and California, as well as programs in Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island, have helped victims of the attacks since the immediately
following days. NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIME VICTIM COMP. BDS., SEPTEMBER 11 COMPENSATION
INFORMATION, available athttp://www.nacvcb.org/Septemberl linfo.html (last visited Oct. 13,
2004).
104. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10602(a)-(b)(6) (West 1995 & Supp. 2004). To be eligible for
VOCA compensation program funding, programs must: (1) include victims of drunk driving
and domestic violence among eligible recipients; (2) promote victim cooperation with law
enforcement authorities; (3) certify that VOCA grants will not be used to supplant state funds
otherwise available to provide crime victim compensation; (4) make compensation awards to
victims who are nonresidents of the state on the same basis as it would to residents;
(5) provide compensation to victims of federal crimes; (6) provide compensation to residents
of the state who are victims of compensable crimes; (7) "not, except pursuant to rules issued
by the program to prevent unjust enrichment of the offender, deny compensation to any
victim because of that victim's familial relationship to the offender, or because" she is related
to, or cohabitates with, the offender; (8) not provide compensation to any person who has
been convicted of an offense under Federal law with respect to any time period during which
the person is delinquent in paying a fine, other monetary penalty, or restitution imposed for
the offense; and (9) comply with VOCA administrative program requirements. Id
§ 10602(b).
105. Id § 10603.
106. Id § 10601(b).
107. EDDY, supra note 29, at 3.
108. Id.
109. See LISA NEWMARK ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE NATIONAL EvALUATION OF
STATE VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE ADMINISTRATORS 2 (200 1) (on file
with author) (charting the fluctuation in amounts deposited into VOCA funds due to
variations in prosecution and collection of penalties). Amounts available for victim
compensation and assistance programs vary as well due to caps imposed by Congress on the
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In 2001, the latest year for which the Office for Victims of Crime
reported data, upward of $360 million was paid to over 146,000 crime
victims for expenses including medical, dental, and mental health
expenses; lost wages and loss of support; funeral and burial expenses;
crime scene clean up; forensic sexual assault exams; and other
expenses."' Domestic violence and child abuse survivors (including
sexual abuse) each accounted for approximately 20% of the reported
claims, while sexual assault accounted for approximately 7% of all
claims."' Although VOCA authorizes payments for terrorism-related
injuries, only eighteen claims based on terrorist attacks were filed in
2001, representing less than 0.01% of all claims. 2 Presumably, after
September 11, that number has substantially increased, given VOCA's
role in funding compensation for victims of the September 11 attacks.
The programs represent a tremendously important resource for
victims of domestic and sexual violence. Systemic barriers that
frequently prevent victims from recovering from offenders or through
other tort actions make a government program all the more potent."3
However, limited resources and resulting programmatic restrictions
curtail the state programs' ability to meet victims' needs."' As a
amounts of monies in the fund that would be released to the states. Id. Funding for victim
compensation programs also may be diminished by accountability problems that may prevent
funds earmarked for crime victim programs to be diverted to other uses. See, e.g., Gary
Hendricks, Legislators Begin Quest to Track Crime Victims' Cut ofFine Money, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Oct. 9, 2003, at Cl (reporting on hearings to account for criminal fines earmarked
for domestic violence services).
110. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2001 VICTIMS OF CRIME
ACT OF 1984 PERFORMANCE REPORT, STATE COMPENSATION PROGRAM (2002) [hereinafter OJP
2001 PERFORMANCE REPORT], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/fund/vocanpr_
vc01 html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004). Of these expenses, medical and dental represented the
largest category ($165,927,741), followed by lost wages and loss of support ($73,530,472),
mental health expenses ($55,402,219), funeral and burial expenses ($40,292,775), forensic
sexual assault exams ($8,556,366), crime scene cleanup ($104,209), and other expenses
($23,115,147). Id
111. Id. Domestic violence claims totaled 32,093 of a total of 146,156 listed claims,
while child abuse victims represented 33,162, and sexual assault represented 10,937 of those
claims. Id. Sexual assault and domestic violence together represent nearly 30% of all cases.
Id. Reports indicate that in 2002, domestic violence victims alone represented 35% of all
claims. NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIME VICTIM COMp. BDS., COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS AGAIN AT
RECORD HIGHS..., athttp//:www.nacvcb.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
112. OJP 2001 PERFORMANCE REPORT, supm note 110..
113. See infa Part IVB.5.
114. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CRIME: AN
ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN PROGRAMS 86 (1983) [hereinafter, NIJ COMPENSATION ANALYSIS]
(on file with author) (noting the limited scope of compensation programs despite the
"magnanimous intent" underlying their enactments). The legislative history reveals the
limited vision that accompanied the programs' enactment. For example, the 1979 House
Report projected that the federal support contemplated by the bill would allow the then-
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National Institute of Justice report evaluating the compensation
programs observed, "the theory behind victim compensation could
support a more generous level of financial assistance to a far larger
class of victims than most programs now recognize as deserving."' "5
Programs restrict eligibility in several ways. For example, to
comply with VOCA, program requirements limit awards to "innocent"
victims, and require that the applicant facilitates law enforcement
prosecution efforts."6 Applicants must report the crime promptly to
law enforcement, must cooperate with police and prosecutors in the
investigation and prosecution of the crime, and must submit a timely
application to the compensation program."7 VOCA imposes other
limitations as well. For example, it caps the amount that states can
spend on administrative expenses at a maximum of 5% of the amount
of federal funds provided."8  This restriction consequently limits
programs' abilities to develop infrastructure, enhance claims handling,
and conduct outreach."9 VOCA's restrictions suggest an underlying
mistrust of victim behavior more typical of government approaches to
traditional public benefit programs than the 9/11 Fund's "victim-
friendly" orientation.
In contrast to the unlimited funding and demand for full
compensation that characterize the 9/11 Fund, the state victim
compensation programs' structures reflect their scarce resources, and
accordingly mandate modest awards and restrictive eligibility
existing state programs to increase their reaches, which would still extend only to 1.6 to 1.7%
of crime victims. H.R. REP. No. 96-753, at 13 (1980).
115. NIJ COMPENSATION ANALYSIS, supra note 114, at 86-87.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(2) (2000) (requiring programs to promote cooperation with
law enforcement); id. § 10602(b)(8) (prohibiting payments to those who had been convicted
of a federal criminal offense). The drafters deliberately distinguished the crime victim
compensation program, which would assist "innocent" victims, from beneficiaries of public
assistance. H.R. REP. No. 94-1550, at 4 (1976). For example, the 1976 House Report
emphasized its concern with guarding against unwarranted payments. Id It quoted
testimony of the Executive Secretary of the New Jersey Violent Crimes Compensation Board,
who described program requirements that require staff to "verify his innocence" before
issuing awards because "[w]e have no intention of creating another welfare give-away
program or anything like that." Id. at 4 n.8; see also infra notes 132-135 and accompanying
text (discussing "innocent" victim requirement in state compensation programs).
117. OJP VICTIM COMPENSATION, supra note 76, at 329; see also infra notes 136-139
and accompanying text (discussing program eligibility requirements as barriers to recovery).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 10602(a)(3).
119. Presumably, this requirement was incorporated to ensure that victims actually
benefited from the programs. While a laudable goal, one wonders whether this limitation
hampers the development of infrastructure that could address programmatic limitations. For
example, programs have been criticized for the length of time it takes for claims to be
processed, which can take up to six months. Lisa Newmark, Crime Victims Compensalion
Programs NeedsAssesseg 250 NAT'L INST. OF JUST. J. 45 (2003) (on file with author).
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requirements."'2 All states cap the funds victims can recover at
amounts ranging from $5000 to $180,000, with an average cap of
approximately $35,000."2' In 2001, the median award nationally was
$2400.122 Every state regards its victim compensation program as the
"payer[] of last resort" so that the program will only pay expenses that
are not covered by other sources.'23
From the programs' inceptions, restrictions were designed to limit
eligibility. Notably, however, to program administrators' and
Congress's credit, some of the early program restrictions were eased to
ensure that victims who needed assistance could participate. For
example, domestic violence victims initially were excluded due to
eligibility requirements precluding family members of the offender
from recovering."' Once this problem was recognized, VOCA was
amended to require states to allow domestic violence victims to receive
compensation funds. 1'
Despite these modifications, program limitations continue to
thwart victims' ability to recover. Program administrators and program
evaluators alike perceive the programs as underutilized and recognize
that many eligible victims are unaware of program benefits.'6 One
study concluded that only between one-quarter and one-half of eligible
120. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
121. See supm note 29 and accompanying text.
122. NEWMARKETAL., supmnote 109, at 6.
123. OVC VICTIM COMPENSATION, supm note 76, at 330; 42 U.S.C. § 10602(e).
124. OVC VICTIM COMPENSATION, supra note 76, at 326. These requirements
stemmed from the reasonable concern that awarding benefits to family members of the
offender could inadvertently benefit the offender.
125. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7125(c)(1), 102 Stat. 4181,
4422 (1988) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)). VOCA similarly was amended to allow
victims of drunken driving to receive compensation funds. Id.
126. In 1996, the National Association of Crime Victim Compensation Boards
(NACVCB) recommended standards to enhance program operations in four areas identified
as critical to program success, one of which was outreach, training, and communication to
recruit eligible claimants. NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 29, at xiv. In the most recent
evaluation of compensation programs, the "vast majority" of program administrators reported
that they perceived that they received too few claims. NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 109, at
15. The report concluded that there is a "widespread perception" among program
administrators that many potentially eligible claimants do not access program benefits. Id.
Consequently, the report recommended additional outreach activities, particularly those
directed to population groups including non-English-speaking communities. Id; see also,
e.g., NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 29, at xvi-xvii (detailing the importance of outreach); OVC
VICTIM COMPENSATION, supra note 76, at 343-44; Newmark, supra note 119, at 45
(recommending better publicity for compensation programs).
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victims are served by the state programs."' Program administrators
reported that traditionally underserved groups, such as victims of
domestic violence, elder abuse, child physical and sexual abuse, and
adult sexual assault, underutilized the programs, as did non-English
speakers and racial minorities.'28  Researchers attributed the
underutilization to restrictive eligibility criteria and/or insufficient
outreach and education.'29 Of those that filed, two-thirds still reported
a median of $600 in unrecovered losses.'3° Overall, white female
claimants were more satisfied than male or minority claimants with
their experiences with the compensation programs.'
Among those who do file, a range of restrictive requirements
preclude victims from accessing needed assistance. For example,
many programs' interpretation of "innocent" victims precludes
individuals with any criminal record from recovery, rather than
limiting the exclusion to those who committed the crime giving rise to
the compensation claim.' Accordingly, individuals who had been
convicted of unrelated crimes could not receive funds, even when the
prior crime took place many years prior to the crime giving rise to the
claim. Although this requirement undoubtedly originated in an
attempt to ensure that only "law abiding" individuals receive
127. NEWMARK ET AL., supm note 109, at 20 (citing DALE PARENT, BARBARA
AUERBACH & KENNETH CARLSON, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
COMPENSATING CRIME VICTIMS: A SUMMARY OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES 16-17 (1992)).
128. Id at 21. A similar study performed two years later reached the same conclusion.
NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 29, at xvii. Studies have not estimated the percentage of
individuals in each category that do not file claims.
129. NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 29, at xvii. Another recent report found that 80% of
crime victims who incurred expenses as a result were not even aware of crime victim
compensation programs. Ellen Brickman et al., National Institute of Justice, Victim Needs
and Victim Assistance 148 (2003) (manuscript on file with author).
130. NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 29, at xviii. Although $600 may not appear to be a
substantial amount, it could well be to the individual potential claimant. Another recent study
similarly concluded that few of victims' postcrime expenses were reimbursed. BRiCKMAN,
supra note 129, at 148.
131. NEWMARKETAL., supra note 29, atxv.
132. Ten states currently have "felony exclusion" provisions. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-90-712(5) (Michie 2003); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13956(d)(l)-(3) (Deering 2004); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 960.065(l)(d)-(e) (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-7(h) (1997); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-41-17(l)(i) (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.020(4) (West 2003); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 15-B-1 1(c) (2003); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(E)(1)-(2), (F)(I)-(2)
(West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25-19(d)(1)(ii)-(iii) (2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-106(c)
(Michie 2003). Of these, several preclude a crime victim from receiving compensation even
if the felony was unrelated to the event that gave rise to the compensation claim. See, e.g.,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13956(d)(l)-(3); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-7(h); MISS. CODEANN. § 99-
41-17(l)(i); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(E)(l)-(2), (F)(l)-(2); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-
106(c); see also OVC VICTIM COMPENSATION, supra note 76, at 330 (discussing eligibility
requirements of most state programs).
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compensation, it can produce a harsh result."' In addition, despite the
fact that the state programs were enacted to recognize the particular
harms that result from crime, and therefore to compensate victims
regardless of financial status, some states condition eligibility on
financial need.'4 Although those requirements may help states focus
scarce resources on those who need them the most, they also can
prevent victims from obtaining the assistance they need to recover
from the violence. "5
Perhaps most significantly, requirements that victims promptly
report and cooperate with the police may prevent victims who fear
retaliation from the perpetrator or who mistrust law enforcement for
other reasons from obtaining assistance.'36 This requirement falls
133. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Ohio Victims of Crimes Div., No. 02AP-299, 2002 WL
1937820, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (denying a compensation award to a crime victim who
ran from an officer who attempted to arrest him for traffic violations). Ironically, a claimant
convicted of a felony after she was the victim of a compensable crime may be eligible for
compensation. See In re Butera, 620 N.E.2d 312, 313 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1993). Debate preceding
VOCA's announcement suggests that distrust of victims may have played a part in the
legislation's requirements. See, e.g., Robert Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted
Personal Injury, 50 MINN. L. REv. 271, 273-74 (1966) (suggesting that the federal victim
compensation program exclude cases where the victim directly or indirectly contributed to
the crime as a means of ensuring that "culpable" victims such as "women yearning for rape"
do not receive compensation); see also 'nfia Part VB.
134. Eight states currently may exclude victims from compensation if they do not meet
"financial hardship" requirements. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.13(8) (West 2001); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 74-7305(d) (2002); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 346.140(3) (Banks-Baldwin 2003); MICH.
CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 18.361(7) (West 2001); NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1822(5) (2002); NEV. REV
STAT. ANN. 217.108 (Michie 2001); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(6)(a) (McKinney 2004); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-40-1 10(b)(ii), (d). This requirement had its roots in the early drafts of the bill,
which required that a victim's compensation (or that of his or her surviving dependent(s)) be
withheld until the victim exhausted his liquid assets. S. REP. No. 93-83, at 15 (1973). In
1978, Congress debated whether to allow or require states to condition awards on a showing
of means. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-1762, at 10-11 (1978) (rejecting the proposed Senate
amendment that would prohibit means testing); S. REP. No. 95-963, at 7 (1978) (prohibiting
means tests). Ultimately, the Conference Report adopted a compromise under which states
would be permitted to adopt means tests and the Attorney General would study the impact of
such tests to assess its future desirability. H.R. REP. No. 95-1762, at 11 (1978). Although
some states retaining financial eligibility requirements claim not to enforce this
programmatic requirement, its presence in the statutory scheme leaves applicants vulnerable
to rejection, particularly during periods of limited financial resources.
135. See, e.g., Lynch v. Crime Victim Comp. Bd., 748 S.W2d 160, 162 (Ky. Ct. App.
1988) (denying compensation to an infant whose mother was killed during a robbery, given
his access to social security and insurance payments, despite evidence that those resources
were inadequate to pay ordinary daily living expenses); Regan v. Crime Victims Comp. Bd.,
441 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (N.Y. 1982) (denying compensation for lost wages to a mugging
victim due to evidence that he had substantial savings and an interest in real property).
136. OVC VICTIM COMPENSATION, supra note 76, at 329-30. For example, in Allen v
State, a shooting victim was denied compensation for medical expenses and a month of lost
work resulting from the shooting when he stated that he didn't know who shot him, but the
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particularly harshly on domestic and sexual violence victims, people of
color, and members of immigrant communities.'37 It also can deter
crime victims who face the common challenge of not being able to
take time off from their jobs to participate in the frequent calls of the
officer would not accept that answer. 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 647, 674 (1995). To appease the officer,
the claimant told him that "while he was standing at a bus stop, two white men jumped out of
some bushes, robbed him and shot him." Id These "different versions" of the incident that
gave rise to the injuries precluded the claimant's recovery. Id; accord In re Johnson, 52 Ill.
Ct. Cl. 636, 636, 638 (2000) (denying compensation to a shooting victim who maintained that
he was unable to identify his assailant for failing to cooperate). But see, e.g., Ellis v. Crime
Victims Comp. Comm'n, 432 S.E.2d 160, 165 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a domestic
violence victim's refusal to prosecute did not constitute "failure to prosecute" that would
warrant denying compensation); hn re Smith, 698 N.E.2d 131, 132 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1997)
(finding that a victim's signing a dismissal of charges against the offender did not constitute
failure to cooperate with prosecution).
137. Only about half of all incidents of domestic violence are reported to the police.
GREENFELD ET A.., supra note 56, at 19. The reasons victims do not report the incident
include the belief that it is a personal matter, the belief that the police will do nothing, and the
fear of offender retaliation. Id For women of color, experience with and perceptions of law
enforcement's bias increase victims' reluctance generally to participate in the criminal justice
process. See, e.g., Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racii imagery
and Stereoopes. The Afncan-American Woman and the Battered Women s Syndrome, 1995
Wis. L. REv. 1003, 1023 (explaining battered African-American women's reluctance to
engage with the police); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Maigins." Intersectionality
Identity Politics, and ViolenceAgainst Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1257 (1993)
(describing women of color's reluctance to subject their private lives to the scrutiny of a
frequently hostile police force); Beth E. Richie, A Black Feminist Reflection on the
Antiviolence Movemeni 25 SIGNS 1133, 1136-37 (2000) (warning that aggressive policing
tactics "result in increased use of force, mass incarceration and brutality," and threaten safety
in communities of color); Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schweider. 'Murky
Middle Ground" Between Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to
Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. PoL'Y & L. 427, 431-32 (2003) (recognizing
violence by law enforcement personnel and policies that led to higher incarceration rates for
defendants of color than similarly situated whites contribute to victims' reluctance to engage
with the law enforcement system); Jenny Rivera, Intimate Partner Violence Strategies:
Models for Community Participation, 50 ME. L. REv. 283, 294-305 (1998) (exploring
alternative approaches to legislative and policy directives concerning violence against women
that integrate communities of color). See generally Ms. FOUND. FOR WOMEN, SAFETY &
JUSTICE FOR ALL: EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WOMEN's ANTI-VIOLENCE
MOVEMENT AND THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1-2 (2003), at http://www.ms.foundation.org/
user-assets/PDF/Program/safety-justice.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (critiquing over-
reliance on the criminal justice system, particularly in light of disproportionate impact of
aggressive policing practices on communities of color, while recognizing the value of the
criminal justice system in saving battered women's lives). Immigrant victims of crime in
general, and domestic violence in particular, face fear of repercussions resulting from
reporting crimes against them to the police. Id. at 14. Provisions enacted as part of the 1994
Violence Against Women Act that allow battered immigrant women to self-petition for
permanent residency without having to rely on their batterers for their documentation
recognized the particular vulnerability of these women to law enforcement action. See 8
U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1) (2000) (regarding self-petitioning); 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (regarding
suspension of deportation).
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criminal justice system. ' And it may preclude the many victims who
delay reporting due to the common experiences of fear, shame, shock,
and trauma, each of which may be exacerbated for victims of domestic
and sexual violence, from recovering at all.'
In sum, although the programs represent an invaluable resource, a
range of programmatic reforms would enable them to more effectively
fulfill their goals of helping victims recover from crime.' ° The
contrasting generosity of the response to the September 11 attacks
highlights the unnecessary restrictions of the state crime victim
compensation programs' requirements. For example, state programs
may exclude members of nontraditional families from recovering
when they lose their life partners due to crime. Before September 11,
New York's Crime Victim Board excluded victims whose gay life-
partners were killed in homicides from recovering funds because they
did not fit the state's definition of "spouse," although married partners
automatically would receive payments for loss of support. 1'4' In the
138. For example, in In re Mandley, an assault victim was denied compensation for
"failing to cooperate" with law enforcement after she was unable to attend a second court
appearance due to the fact that she ran her own child care business and could not afford to
close it again. 47 I11. Ct. Cl. 613, 614 (1995). Ms. Mandley was coping with domestic
violence and had to go to the doctor and therapy several times a week. Id. Even though those
needs were unrelated to the attack for which she was seeking compensation, her case
illustrates the strain "full cooperation" puts on crime victims, particularly those facing
multiple challenges in their lives. Id at 615.
139. For example, in Doe v Fischetti; a rape victim who did not report the rape until
three years after the crime was denied compensation despite her testimony and the testimony
of a witness whom she had told about the rape. 676 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998). See generallyOFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIcTIMS' RIGHTS
AND SERVICES FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY: NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD MENTAL HEALTH
COMMUNITY 219, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/new/directions/pdftxt/bulletins/bltn9.pdf
(last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (documenting the mental health impact of violent crime, including
impairment of victims' abilities and willingness to cooperate with and participate in the
criminal justice system). Courts have begun to recognize that victims of trauma such as
domestic violence and sexual assault may be unable to file claims within the statutory
limitations period. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief, Procedure and Justice: The September
11th Victim Compensaton Fung 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 484 (2003) (explaining the impact
of trauma on victims' abilities to assert claims).
140. Several reports have detailed recommended reforms. See, e.g., OVC VICTIM
COMPENSATION, supra note 76, at 336-51 (detailing eighteen recommendations, including
increasing medical benefits for catastrophic physical injuries and eliminating restrictive
reporting requirements); NEWMARK ET AL., supra note 109, at xix (listing recommendations,
including outreach to historically underserved victims and a reduction in claims processing
time).
141. See Secord v. Fischetti, 653 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). Virginia's
crime victim compensation board maintained the same policy. Sheila Hahn, the surviving
partner of Peggy Neff, who was killed in the terrorist attack on the Pentagon, was denied
compensation by the Virginia crime victim compensation board. Despite the fact that they
had been partners for over seventeen years, she was not covered under the Virginia crime
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aftermath of the attacks, New York Governor Pataki issued an
executive order that would allow gay partners of individuals who died
in the attacks to recover for loss of support in the same way as married
heterosexual couples.42 Subsequently, the state's rule was permanently
changed to allow gay partners of victims of other crimes to recover as
well. 143  Similarly, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge authorized a
change to the Pennsylvania program's existing practice to allow
"significant others" of those killed as a result of the September 11
attacks to recover under that state's victim compensation fund.' This
example illustrates how "sympathy" for victims of the September 11
attacks has shone a light on, and effectively changed, one unnecessarily
restrictive state victim compensation policy. It suggests that other
restrictive program requirements may unnecessarily bar victims from
receiving the assistance they need as well.
III. THE 9/11 VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
The 9/11 Fund emerged from a very different context and reflects
a very different view of victim compensation. Congress enacted it
with minimum debate or study, as part of a bill addressing the
financial sustainability of the airline industry.'45 The legislation was
born in reaction to a national emergency, and reflects an attempt to
victim compensation program, which provides survivor benefits only for a spouse or other
legally dependent relative. See alsoVA. CoDEANN. § 19.2-368(4)(A)(2) (Michie Supp. 2003)
(limiting those eligible to file a compensation claim to "[a] surviving spouse, parent,
grandparent, sibling or child, including posthumous children"); Chris Lombardi, Partners of
Sept. 11 Victims Denied Compensation, WOMEN'S ENEwS, Jan. 19, 2002, at http://www.
womensenews.org/article.cfin/dyn/aid/789/context/archive (last visited Oct. 13, 2004);
Rebecca Farmer, Same Sex Couples Face Post-September 11 Discrimination, NAT'L NOW
TIMES, at http://www.now.org/nnt/spring-2002/couples.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
Apparently, Ms. Hahn was able to recover from the federal 9/11 Fund. Steve Vogel, US.
Awards Lesbian 9/11 Compensation for Loss of Partner, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2003, at B01;
Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, HRC Applauds Justice Department for Awarding
Survivor Benefits to Woman who Lost Partner in 9/11 Attack on Pentagon (Jan. 24, 2003), at
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=PressRoom&CONTENTID= 10006&Templat
e=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
142. Exec. Order No. 103.30 (Oct. 10, 2001), 9 N.Y. COMp. CODE R. & REGS.
§ 5.113.30 (2004). The executive order also would allow unmarried heterosexual couples
who also can prove mutual interdependence. Id.
143. Id. The Executive Order permits gay and lesbian partners of crime victims to
recover compensation when the partners can demonstrate that they are dependent on their
partners for at least half of their financial support. Id Prior to the Executive Order, the
requirement was 75%, which effectively precluded same-sex couples from recovering in most
instances. Id.
144. Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex Partners.
Defining Family Through Tagedy, 75 TEMP. L. REv. 31, 85-86 (2002).
145. SeeAlexander, supa note 39, at 632-33.
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respond to an unprecedented affront to the country's safety and
security. The victims of the attacks were unquestionably seen as
"innocent" and "deserving" of adequate compensation. Concern for
fraud was minimal and budgetary limitations were nonexistent.' 6 The
program's design accordingly encouraged victim participation and met
victims on their own terms.' 7
The question of the award amounts received the most attention,
and ultimately may prove most important to victims in their
assessment of the program. The amount of reimbursement available to
victims cannot be underestimated in assessing the effectiveness of a
victim compensation program. However, other aspects of program
administration, such as outreach, public education, concern for
administrative efficiency, and support for victims utilizing the
program, also are critical to a program's effectiveness. Putting the
issue of award amount to the side, the 9/11 Fund can be seen as a case
study of how victim compensation might be approached in the absence
of budgetary restrictions and latent bias against victims.
A. Program Structure, Benefits, andReqwrements
Congress created the 9/11 Fund as part of the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA), eleven days after the
attacks.' 6 In enacting the program, Congress responded to the airline
industry's financial concerns following the attacks, which were
heightened by the ban on air traffic, cancelled trips, and the prospect of
potential liability associated with the attacks.'4 9 The ATSSSA delivered
a range of benefits to the airline industry, including federal loan
guarantees of up to $10 billion, compensation of up to $5 billion in
grants to cover direct losses attributable to the attacks, compensation
for "incremental losses" for the period between the attacks and the end
of that calendar year,'5° and reimbursement for increases in the cost of
insurance.''
146. Ken Feinberg and his law firm staff worked free of charge, but the 9/11 Fund's
administrative costs totaled $86 million over their three years of work. David W Chen,
Strng Details in FinalReport on 9/11 Fung N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004, at B 1.
147. See infra notes 152-172 and accompanying text.
148. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 401, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49
U.S.C.A. § 40101 note (West Supp. 2004)).
149. Id.; see also, e.g., Robert S. Peck, The Victim Compensation Fund: Born from a
Unique Confluence ofEvents Not Likely to Be Duplicateg 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 209, 216-17
(2003).
150. ATSSSA § 101(a)(1).
151. Id. § 201(b).
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The 9/11 Fund was enacted as part IV of the ATSSSA, with the
stated goals of providing compensation and a no-fault alternative to
tort litigation to individuals and their families who were killed or
injured as a result of the attacks.'5 2 In exchange for waiving their rights
to sue,'53 families of those killed in the attacks, and those injured as a
result, were promised "swift, inexpensive, and predictable resolution of
claims.""'5  Victims would receive full compensation.'5  Awards would
be funded by the United States Treasury, with no limit placed on the
total program budget.'56 In this sense, the 9/11 Fund represented an
unprecedented expenditure of public funding for compensation of
victims of violent criminal wrongdoing.'5 7 To the extent that victim
compensation was included in order to facilitate the airlines' financial
recovery, the compensation aspect can be seen as ancillary to the bill's
main purpose, not unlike the way the state compensation programs are
ancillary to the criminal justice system.
152. Id § 403.
153. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i). The ATSSSA also limited the liability of the airline
industry. Congress later extended that protection to limit suits against the City of New York,
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the other airports, and Boeing (manufacturer
of the airlines used in the attack). Id. § 408(a) (original provision); Pub. L. No. 107-71,
§§ 201(a), 408(a), 115 Stat. 597, 645-47 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note).
154. September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar.
13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)).
155. Peck, supra note 149, at 233.
156. ATSSSA § 404(b); September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 11,234; see also Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 E3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2003)
(characterizing the statute authorizing the 9/11 Fund as a "blank check").
157. Like VOCA, which, as discussed at length in Part lI.B, supr, involves virtually
no expenditure of public funding, analogous federal funding schemes for victims of criminal
or civil wrongdoing are funded by contributions from the wrongdoers or members of the
industry whose activities gave rise to the injuries. See, e.g., Black Lung Benefit Act, 30
U.S.C. §§ 901, 934 (2000) (requiring operators to repay government for any payments made
to claimants); 42 U.S.C.. § 2210 (2000) (requiring nuclear power plan operators to hold
insurance and contribute prescribed amounts to a fund to cover claims in the event of an
"extraordinary nuclear occurrence"); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -15; 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2000)
(funding payments for injuries resulting from vaccination by a fund comprised of taxes on
vaccines, for claims arising after effective date of the program; however, public funds were
appropriated for pre-existing claims); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Star. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7246 (West Supp. 2004)) (authorizing a civil penalty for
violation of that law's provisions and accepting additional donations to augment payments to
victims); see also, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th
Cong. (2003) (proposing a privately funded, publicly administered fund for victims of bodily
injury caused by asbestos exposure); cf Lydia Pilgreen, With Funds Wnding Down,
Questions Remain About Longer-Term Needs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at B8 (questioning
whether the distribution of most of the private funds raised as direct cash assistance to victims
constituted an "unprecedented charitable windfall" that would fail to address their longer-
term needs).
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The ATSSSA includes a series of provisions designed to protect
the airline and related industries by discouraging victims from
pursuing tort actions and encouraging program participation. ' For
example, it promised claimants a certain and timely determination of
their claims.9 It eliminated the uncertainty of tort litigation because
claimants were not required to prove liability or causation, and would
have no problems with enforceability.'0 Claimants could obtain a
nonbinding estimate of what their award would be before they chose to
file, could elect a process through which their applications would
receive expedited review, and could request a review before the Special
Master if they were unsatisfied with the determinations.'6
Significantly, the calculation of award amounts was designed to
be sufficiently substantial to discourage private litigation.6 While the
precise approach was the subject of much discussion and debate, the
ultimate compensation awards included calculations of both economic
and noneconomic losses with presumptions and caps that reflected the
Special Master's concerns for horizontal equity.'63 Based on those
158. ATSSSA § 405. For example, the Act caps recovery from any tort claim at the
limits of liability coverage maintained by the air carriers. Id. § 408(a)(1). The cap was
thought to approximate $1.5 billion per carrier, which would quickly be exhausted, thereby
limiting tort recovery. Rabin, supra note 77, at 792 (citing Lizette Alvarez & Stephen
Labaton, A Nation Challenged" The Bailout,-An Airline Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001,
atAl). In addition, any claim would have to be brought in the Southern District of New York,
and would be the "exclusive remedy" for damages arising out of the attacks. ATSSSA § 408.
At its close, the Fund processed over 7300 claims for death and physical injury arising out of
the attacks. This includes claims by over 98% of those eligible who lost a family member in
the attacks. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CLOSING STATEMENT FROM THE SPECIAL MASTER, MR.
KENNETH R. FEINBERG, ON THE SHUTDOWN OF THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION
FUND, at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/closingstatement.pdf (last visited Oct.
21, 2004). Nevertheless, some of those affected by the attacks, including families of those
who died as well as injured workers, have brought suit against potentially negligent parties
such as airlines, airports, security firms, and airplane manufacturers. See Leslie Eaton, Legal
Battles Reflect Unhealed Wounds of TerrorAttack, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at B I.
159. In contrast to litigation, which can easily stretch over a period of years, the statute
required the Special Master designated to administer the 9/11 Fund to issue a written
determination of each claim within 120 days of each application. ATSSSA § 405(b)(3).
160. Alexander, supra note 39, at 633 n.29.
161. September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.ER. § 104.31 (2003).
162. Abraham & Logue, supa note 20, at 596-97; Rabin supra note 77, at 792. The
basic calculus for awards includes both economic and noneconomic losses. ATSSSA
§ 405(b)(1)(B)(i). As Professor Rabin notes, this is a very different motivation than those
underlying other no-fault systems, such as workers compensation. Rabin, supra note 77, at
792-93.
163. ATSSSA § 405(b)(1)(B)(i). For example, the Special Master established
presumed limits for economic harm, based on income levels up to the ninety-eighth
percentile of individual income in the United States, or $231,000. See 28 C.ER. § 104.43;
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXPLANATION OF PROCESS FOR COMPUTING PRESUMED ECONOMIC
LOSS, at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/vc-matrices.pdf (last updated Aug. 27,
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calculations, the program presumed that awards rarely would exceed
$3 million, and rarely would be lower than $300,000.' " The Special
Master retained discretion to override the presumed amount derived
from the awards tables and flat amounts, and make an individualized
award based on the facts of the particular case.'65 Although award
levels were higher than any other government-funded benefits
program, high-earner families criticized the approach as penalizing the
financially successful.'66
As a victim compensation program that sought to encourage
participation, program initiatives designed to assist and accommodate
victims warrant examination. For example, the program provided
walk-in centers throughout the country in which claimants could fill
out applications.' 7 A modem Web site described the 9/11 Fund's
2002). The 9/11 Fund ultimately used an economic loss methodology that incorporates an
"All Active Males" table, in order to maximize the duration of expected foregone earnings
and accommodate potential increases by women in the labor force. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra. The legislation also authorized consideration of the value of replacement services in
order to recognize the value of unpaid work for all victims, including those who worked full-
time. 28 C.F.R. § 104.43(c). See generallyMartha F Davis, Valuing Women: A Case Study,
23 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 219, 220-21 (2002) (discussing the discriminatory impact of the
9/11 Fund's initially proposed regulations' failure to recognize the value of unpaid work). In
addition, instead of allowing for a case-by-case determination of noneconomic loss, the
regulations provide for a flat-rate noneconomic loss award of $250,000 per victim, plus an
additional $100,000 for the spouse and each dependent. 28 C.ER. § 104.44. The $250,000
sum was derived from the death benefit paid to families of public safety officers and military
personnel killed in the line of duty. See 38 U.S.C. § 1967 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2000).
Apparently, this structure reflects Special Master Ken Feinberg's concern for horizontal
equity, and the impossibility of assessing the differential pain and suffering experienced by
different victims. September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274,
66,275 (Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.ER. § 104) [hereinafter 9/11 Fund Interim Rule]
(explaining the goal of ensuring substantial minimum compensation for every claimant).
164. 9/11 Fund Interim Rule at 66,274-75. For all cases, the total award calculated
from the tables and presentation of losses will be reduced by collateral sources, defined by
the statute and accompanying regulations to include life insurance and pensions, as well as
death benefit programs and payments by federal, state, or local governments related to the
September 11 attacks, but not charitable contributions. ATSSSA § 405(b)(6); 28 C.ER.
§ 104.47. As it turned out, the mean award for deceased victims was $2,082,035, and the
median award was $1,677,633; the awards for those injured in the attacks ranged from $500
to $8.6 million (comparable statistics are not available for both groups). See U.S. Dep't of
Justice, September 1 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001: Compensation for Deceased
Victims at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensatino/payments-deceased.html (last updated
Nov. 22, 2004); U.S. Dep't of Justice, September 1 1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001:
Compensation for Personal Injury Victims, at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/
paymentsjinjury.html (last updated Nov. 22, 2004).
165. ATSSSA § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii).
166. See Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2003); FITZGERALD L.P. ET
AL., supra note 21, at 33-35.
167. The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund Web site lists centers in Boston,
Massachusetts; Jersey City, New Jersey; Long Island, New York; Piscataway, New Jersey;
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benefits and application procedures, with information available in
English and Spanish. 8 Claimants could schedule appointments on
Saturday as well as during regular business hours.'69 Fund officials
spent countless hours with claimants, helping them negotiate the
application process.'7' As counselors of other victims of crime and
trauma know well, the emotions associated with filing a claim can
interfere with a victim's ability to complete the process, and assistance
in completing claims forms can be invaluable.'7' To encourage
participation and filing before the filing deadline, the 9/11 Fund
conducted an extensive public education campaign.'72 Although this
myriad of victim-friendly efforts may have been developed in order to
discourage litigation rather than to advance a philosophical
commitment to a victim-centered program, they nevertheless
exemplify programmatic efforts to facilitate applications and
processing in a way that resource-strapped state victim compensation
programs cannot sustain.
Stamford, Connecticut; Staten Island, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; San Francisco,
California; Los Angeles, California; Arlington, Virginia; and Manhattan, New York. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CLAIM ASSISTANCE SITES, at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/
claimsassistancecenters.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
168. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, How CAN WE HELP YOU TODAY?, athttp://www.usdoj.
gov/victimcompensation (last visited Oct. 13, 2004). Although the availability of information
in Spanish is laudable, it may not be sufficient to reach many other groups of victims who are
native speakers of other languages. See SAFE HORIZON, COMMENTS ON SEPTEMBER 11TH
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (Nov. 21, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/
victimcompensation/W000564.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (hereinafter SAFE HORIZON
COMMENTS] (recommending availability of program information in multiple languages in
addition to Spanish, including Chinese, Haitian/Creole, Russian, Bengali, and Arabic); accord
Schneider, supm note 139, at 478 & n. 122 (discussing the limitations of the Web site for those
who lack access to computers and those who lack English fluency).
169. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,
Frequently Asked Questions §§ 1-4, at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/faq.html
(Feb. 10, 2004).
170. For example, fund officials conducted almost 4000 hearings with families to
assist in processing their claims. Chen, supra note 146 (describing the final report of the 9/11
Fund).
171. Based on that knowledge, Safe Horizon, among others, urged the Special Master
to provide victim advocates to assist claimants in preparing and submitting their claims
forms. See SAFE HORIZON COMMENTS, supra note 168.
172. Fund officials conducted approximately 100 outreach sessions, including
presentations to large groups of over 600 people, as well as small gatherings with a half-
dozen individuals. E-mail from Ken Feinberg to Heather Pratt (Jan. 17, 2004) (on file with
author). Special Master Ken Feinberg also conducted hundreds of individual meetings with
group members to answer their individual, personal questions about the fund. Id; see also,
e.g., Where Are the Vicims'Families, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, Week in Review at 12
(noting "national advertising campaign" to encourage 9/11 Fund participation).
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B. Legislative History andApproach to Compensation
The 9/11 Fund's unique history and structure have given rise to
scholarly debate about its nature and theoretical underpinnings.'73
Given that creation of the 9/11 Fund was debated for less than three
hours before its enactment,'74 the process of teasing out the theory on
which it was based is necessarily one of analysis in hindsight, and
involves some amount of speculation. On first review, the analogy to
tort seems a near-perfect fit. The basic structure of awards consists of
both economic and noneconomic damages designed to provide "just
compensation"--the expected recovery in tort.' In some ways, the
9/11 Fund can be seen as importing a class action settlement
approach-perhaps for the first time-to a definable class of crime
victims. '
However, as a developing body of scholarship elucidates, the 9/11
Fund deviates from a traditional tort model in numerous ways.' First,
the 9/11 Fund shields potential defendants from liability while failing
to exact any contribution that could serve the deterrent interests of the
tort system.' The government's decision to foot the bill is particularly
173. See, e.g., Symposium, Alter Disaster" The September 11th Compensation Fund
and the Future of Civil Justice, 53 DEPAuL L. REV. 205 (2003); Symposium, The Law and
Economics of Provihdng Compensation for Harm Caused by Terrorism, 36 IND. L. REV. 229
(2003); see also, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, Compensation for Victims of Terror. A Specialized
Jurisprudence of Inju-y, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1245, 1259 (2002); Rabin, supra note 10;
Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating Victims of September 11, 49 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 573 (2001).
174. Alexander, supra note 39, at 632.
175. 1d at 638.
176. Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Pnnciples in the Victim Compensation
Fund, 53 DEPAuL L. REV. 719, 721 (2003). Professor Diller notes that the 9/11 Fund is
distinguishable from mass tort settlement in several ways: the 9/11 Fund does not require
claimants to compromise their compensation levels; it also does not require the administrator
to grapple with the difficult problem of distributing a set, and inadequate, pool of funds. Id.
at 746-47. In addition, the 9/11 Fund provides the award benefits to claimants without them
having to go through the trouble and expense of filing a lawsuit, engaging in some degree of
litigation, and engaging in settlement negotiations. Id. at 745-46.
177. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 173, at 574-76 (concluding that the 9/11 Fund more
closely resembles a "no-fault plan" than "mini version of the tort system"); see also Rabin,
supra note 77, at 783-88; Diller, supra note 176, at 721-23; Alexander, supra note 39, at 639.
178. See W PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 4 (5th ed. 1984). Presumably, the bill was designed to
protect the airline industry and other private entities from potential liability, and does not
assign responsibility to the government for any potential liability for the attacks. However,
some commentators have inquired whether the government might appropriately bear the cost
as a result of its responsibility for failing to detect or prevent the attacks. See, e.g., Rabin,
supra note 10, at 1867; Schneider, supa note 139, at 485-90; Shapo, supra note 10, at 813,
816; Samuel Issacharoff & Anna Morawiec Mansfield, Compensation for the Victims of
September 11, at 16 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The report of the 9/11
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unusual in light of the substantial questions about the viability of tort
claims against the airlines or other entities protected by the 9/11
Fund.'78 In contrast to the individualized determinations of loss that
characterize tort recovery, the 9/11 Fund presumes a common
experience among victims, uses presumptive schedules to calculate
economic loss, and applies a flat figure to award noneconomic
damages.'8° In addition, the 9/11 Fund's reduction of awards by
"collateral sources," marks a significant departure from the
individualized inquiry required by the tort system.'8'
The 9/11 Fund's emphasis on fair and adequate compensation for
victims, particularly when considered in the political and social context
surrounding its enactment, suggests that compassion for the victims
played a role in the 9/11 Fund's enactment in addition to the desire to
protect the airline industry.'82 The Interim Rule refers to the 9/11 Fund
Commission may support these conclusions. See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST
ATrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ArrACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (recounting events that led to
the attacks and failures that may have contributed to allowing them to occur).
179. Rabin, supra note 77, at 773; Anthony J. Sebok, What, Law Got to Do with It?
Designing Compensation Schemes in the Shadow of the Tort System, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
501, 505-15 (2002). As Professor Diller points out, lawsuits based on other terrorist attacks
have not been successful against anyone other than the terrorists themselves. Diller, supra
note 176, at 722. But see In r Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F Supp. 2d 279, 314 (S.D.N.Y 2003)
(denying motion to dismiss negligence and related claims by families of individuals killed as
a result of the September 11 attacks against air carriers, airport security companies, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, and the World Trade Center Properties).
180. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.FR. § 104.43 (2003);
accord Stephan Landsman, A Chance to Be Heard- Thoughts About Schedules, Caps, and
Collateral Source Deductions m the September 1 1th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL
L. REv. 393, 400-02 (2003); Rabin, supra note 173, at 583-85; see also Diller, supra note 176,
at 740 (criticizing the argument that presumptive award tables serve public benefit program
goals of creating parity between claimants, predictability, and administrative ease).
Nevertheless, the "core principles used by the fund" to determine award amounts draws on a
tort, rather than social welfare, model. See Diller, supra note 176, at 740; accord Shapo,
supra note 10, at 813-14.
181. See discussion supra note 164. In contrast to the 9/11 Fund awards, tort awards
are not generally reduced by collateral offsets because to do so would unfairly privilege
defendants lucky enough to have injured parties who planned well, for example, by obtaining
sufficient life insurance. This concern is absent in the 9/11 Fund because it requires no
tortfeasor, or potential tortfeasor, contribution. Notably, no significant nontort source of
compensation for lost life requires collateral offset for life insurance. Abraham & Logue,
supra note 20, at 592; see also Robert A. Katz, Too Much ofa Good Thing: When Charitable
Gifts Augment Victim Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 547, 563-66 (2003); Shapo, supra
note 173, at 1255.
182. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 77, at 771-72 ("A long, bitter contest over years, in
which families of September 11 th victims had nothing beyond recriminations, bitterness, and
frustration with 'the system,' almost certainly would have been regarded as intolerable to the
national community."); Shapo, supra note 173, at 1252 (describing the 9/11 Fund as "both a
symbol of displaced vengeance and a marker of social compassion").
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as "an unprecedented expression of compassion" by the American
people for the September 11 victims and their families.' 3 The
reference is not surprising given the number of public comments
describing the 9/11 Fund as "a testament to Congressional and
taxpayer generosity.'' The unprecedented level of charitable giving
also reflected the public's desire to take care of the victims."5 Some
have suggested that a public sense of "collective unity" or "defiance"
may have spurred the government to craft a solution that adequately
addressed the victims' needs.'86 Given this sentiment, public opinion
may not have tolerated protracted and contentious litigation over
liability.'87
Although the 9/11 Fund's legislative history is minimal, it offers
some insight into Congress's intent. Congress's primary concern was
protecting the airline industry's fiscal viability.'8 However, Congress
also was concerned that victims receive compensation even if the
airlines or other corporate defendants would be found not liable, or if
insurance funds were exhausted.9 As Senator McCain put it:
183. September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274 (Dec.
21,2001) (codified at 28 C.ER. § 104).
184. September 1 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar.
13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.ER. § 104).
185. Alexander, supm note 39, at 638. As of September 2003, $2.6 billion in private,
philanthropic funds had been donated to support charitable efforts in response to the
September 11 attacks. LOREN RENZ, 9/11 RELIEF AND REGRANTING FUNDs: A SUMMARY
REPORT ON FuNDs RAISED AND ASSISTANCE 12 (2003), available athttp://www.fdncenter.org./
research/trends.analysis/pdf/9_1 Irelief_funds.pdf; cf Lydia Polgreen, With Funds Winding
Down, Questions Remains About Longer- Term Needs, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at B8 (NY
region, 09 Charities) (questioning whether the distribution of most of the private funds raised
as direct cash assistance to victims constituted "unprecedented charitable windfall" that
would fail to address their longer term needs).
186. Alexander, supm note 39, at 638. Alexander suggests that the possibility that the
federal government may have been partly at fault may also have played a role in the remedy
fashioned. Id; see also discussion and sources cited supm note 178.
187. See Rabin, supr note 77, at 771.
188. See 147 CONG. REc. H.R.5894 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Young). Debate in the House was limited to one hour. 147 CONG. Rc. E1764 (daily ed. Oct.
2,2001) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
189. Notably, to the extent Congress expressed opposition to the 9/11 Fund before it
was enacted, members focused primarily on the limits it imposed on victim compensation.
See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H.R.5905 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Jones)
(objecting to the bill's failure to include amounts for punitive damages and reduction of
compensation based on collateral source compensation, and objecting to the 9/11 Fund's
limiting compensation for survivors while imposing no liability on the airlines); 147 CONG.
REC. H.R.591 1 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (objecting to inequities
created by virtue of basing compensation on the amount of deceased worker's earnings). A
few Congresspersons, however, raised concerns about whether the 9/11 Fund was overly
generous, questioning whether the tort model was appropriate in a scheme in which the
taxpayer was paying for the benefits, and whether this would then be the model for future
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No amount of money can begin to compensate the victims for their
suffering.... The intent of the fund is to ensure that the victims of this
unprecedented, unforeseeable, and horrific event, and their families do
not suffer financial hardship in addition to the terrible hardships they
already have been forced to endure.Y
Similarly, Senator Leahy expressed this compassionate view of
victims' needs: "The heart of every American aches for those who
died or have been injured because of the tragic terrorist attacks ... on
September 1 1th. Our first priority should be ensuring that [the
victims'] needs are met and that they receive adequate
compensation.""'' He saw a collective responsibility to provide "fair
compensation," which would be provided through a plan that offers
"prompt filing, quick review, and prompt payments" as best addressing
victims' needs.'92 Senator Hatch similarly expressed his concern for
victims, describing the 9/11 Fund as a "generous administrative
remedy."'' 3 Other members expressed their concerns for adequate
victim compensation as well.'94  Thus, while the program structure
reflects an attempt to approximate tort remedies, it additionally was
compensation programs. 147 CONG. REc. E1764 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Waxman); 147 CONG. REC. S9603 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2001) (statement of Senator Enzi). The
other primary objections to the ATSSSA focused on its failure to provide more assistance for
workers who were laid off as a result of the attacks. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REc. H.R.5907
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Oberstar); 147 CONG. REC. H.R.5911 (daily ed.
Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. McCarthy); 147 CoNG. REC. H.R.5911 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
2001) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (objecting as well to the bill's failure to federalize airline
security); 147 CONG. REc. H.R.5912 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Rahall);
147 CONG. REC. H.R.5915 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Stark); 147 CONG.
REc. S9595 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold); 147 CONG. REc. S9598
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
190. 147 CONG. REC. S9589, S9594 (daily ed. Sept. 21,2001).
191. 147 CONG. REC. S9589, S9598 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001).
192. Id.; accord 147 CONG. REC. H.R.5913 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of
Rep. Delahunt). Interestingly, Senator Leahy supported the program's focus on helping the
"neediest" victims and their families, and therefore supported reducing awards by the amount
received through life insurance, death benefits, or other government programs. 147 CONG.
REC. S9599 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
193. 147 CONG. REc. S9594 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
accord 147 CONG. REc. S9593 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
194. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REc. H.R.5906 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Turner); 147 CONG. REC. H.R.5897 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Young)
(characterizing bill as "very responsive to victims of terrorist attacks"); 147 CONG. REC.
H.R.5898 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Gephardt) (noting "horror to our
American family" and the violation, grief, and sadness they inflicted); 147 CONG. REc. S9589
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Bond) (citing need for a "structured means of
providing compensation to the victims").
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driven by a concern for the victims that could be characterized as
humanitarian, or serving social welfare.9
Public sentiment demanded that victims be given full
compensation with a minimum of administrative difficulty. In this
sense, the public view of victims was starkly different than that
generally directed to other victims of violent crimes. Newspaper
articles expressed outrage that victims were required to complete
multiple forms and to submit the same information several times.96
The public discourse notably lacked the focus on administrative
controls to ensure against problems such as fraud that typically
accompany other compensation or public benefit programs.'97 The
level of sympathy expressed may rightly be unique, as is the awarding
of tort-like damages without contribution by any wrongdoer.
Nevertheless, the driving demand that the program offer efficient
195. See supm notes 173-186 and accompanying text. As Professor Issacharoff put it,
the 9/11 Fund represented "a rushed amalgam of congressional desire to induce families out
of the tort system while attempting to reflect a more altruistic national purpose." Issacharoff
& Mansfield, supra note 178, at 29.
196. In the aftermath of the attacks, a stream of newspaper articles reported
complaints that victims were required to fill out multiple, duplicative forms, and had to re-tell
their stories to be eligible for compensation. See, e.g., David Barstow, Notebooks: Pmgram
to Help With Paperwork Maze, N.Y. TIMES., Dec. 11, 2001, at B6 (describing a new city
program assigning caseworkers to families of those killed as a result of the September 11
attacks, to address "months of widespread complaints about bureaucratic bumbling and
needless red tape" resulting from the "vast network" of charities and public agencies
providing assistance to victims); David Barstow, The Donations: Spitzer Plans to Coordinate
Chari Efforts for Victims, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2001, at B10 (describing the N.Y. Attorney
General's efforts to promote coordination in response to perceived "confusion, duplication
and red tape" associated with private relief work); David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, The
Chanties: ChanrtyAbundant But So Is Red Tape, Alter Terror Attac4 N.Y TtMES, Oct. 28,
2001, at Al (reporting that victims were "overwhelmed" by a "maze" of duplicative and
confusing rules, deadlines, and requirements for charitable assistance); Martin Kasindorf &
Haya El Nasser, Huge Aid Pool Just Adds to 9/11 Turmoil, U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 18, 2001,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/septl 1/2001/12/19/usat-charity.htm (last visited
Oct. 13, 2004) (same); Stephanie Saul, 9/11 One Year Later- With Hearts, Wallets Open,
Donations to 9/11 Chanties Keep Flowing, NEwSDAY, Sept. 15, 2002, at A7 (same); Howard
Arenstein, Wheres the Money?, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/11/07/archive/
main317216.shtml?CMP-ILC-SearchStories (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (recounting victims'
frustration and criticism of the Red Cross's administration of disaster assistance).
197. These concerns have been raised even in the context of benefits provided to
domestic violence victims, a group one might expect to be viewed with general sympathy. In
one recent example, New York City Human Resource Commissioner Jason Turner accused
battered women of making false claims of domestic violence in order to obtain subsidized
housing benefits. See, e.g., Press Release, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Mark
Green, et al., Challenge Mayor Giuliani and Governor Pataki to Refute City Commissioner
Jason Turner's Remarks About Battered Women (Jan. 21, 1999), available at
http://www.nowldef.org/htmn/news/pr/Archive/O12199jl.shtml (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
By contrast, no special concern about fraud was raised in connection with those filing with
the 9/11 Fund.
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application and processing procedures that are responsive to victims'
experiences and needs raises important questions about the absence of
the same kind of unmediated empathy and compassion for victims of
sexual and domestic violence or other crimes.
IV CONTRASTING PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES: VICTIMS'
CIRCUMSTANCES AND PROGRAM RATIONALES
To help assess what lessons can be learned from comparing these
two programs this Part will address two fundamental questions. First,
it will analyze the similarities between the groups served by the two
programs to answer the question of the extent to which the comparison
makes sense. Second, it will compare the salient goals and rationales
invoked in support of the respective programs.
A. Victim Experiences
At first blush, when the 9/11 Fund and the state compensation
programs are compared, they may seem too different to merit
comparison. However, a closer look at the experiences of those the
respective programs were designed to help reveals important
similarities in the circumstances facing the victims. The following
vignette starkly illustrates those similarities. In it, a victim services
advocate recounts a client meeting that took place in September 2001:
It was a beautiful September afternoon when I greeted a client named
Clara at a Safe Horizon98 office. She was visibly shaken and on the
verge of tears. She came to my office seeking assistance, but she was
not exactly sure what she needed. She had simply been told that Safe
Horizon could help. I did the best thing I could for her at that moment,
which was to listen. Clara told me that she was not used to talking
about the personal details of her life. She always had managed to deal
with everything herself. But now she needed to talk, and she began to
tell me about her husband, her children, her family, and the sense of
security that had vanished from her life.
She was scared. She had 3 young children and was overwhelmed
with the thought of trying to explain to them the tremendous changes
198. Safe Horizon is the nation's leading victim assistance and advocacy organization.
It operates over eighty programs for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and other
crimes throughout New York City. It also was one of the chief providers of practical and
social services to victims of the September 11 terror attacks, having been designated to
distribute the funds raised by the United Way and New York Community Trust to victims of
the attack. See Safe Horizon Web site, http://www.safehorizon.org (last visited Oct. 13,
2004). In the interest of full disclosure, the author was General Counsel at Safe Horizon
between March 2001 and April 2003.
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that were about to happen in their lives. How was she going to help
them to understand that their father wasn't going to be living with them
anymore?
Theirs had been a one-income family-she had been solely
dependent on her husband's salary and was not sure how she was going
to keep the family together and make ends meet. Clara didn't know how
she would pay for things she had always taken for granted and how she
was going to keep things "normal" for her children.
The vignette went on to explain that the advocate
remembered this day quite vividly-it was September 10th. Clara had
just left her husband after over 10 years of living in a physically and
verbally abusive marriage. She finally decided to leave because she
saw what the violence was doing to her children and did not want them
to be hurt. I knew that like most domestic violence victims she had a
tough road ahead of her.
The two groups of victims are similar in several significant
respects. First, victims of both terrorism and other crimes are harmed
by a violent criminal act. Both may be reliant on the government for
prosecution of the wrongdoers, and both may face slim prospects of-
vindication through the criminal justice system. Because of the
similarity of violent victimization, both are eligible for compensation
under programs funded by the federal Victims of Crime Act of 1984.199
Second, terrorist attacks such as those committed on September
11 and acts of domestic and sexual violence are acts of wide-scale
violence that affect large numbers of people in similar ways." In a
sense, the families of the September 11 victims and those injured by
the attacks all suffered as a result of one act, or series of acts, of
terrorist aggression. Given the unity of the act, the victims were
readily understood to suffer similar responses to the trauma."'
Although less frequently recognized, acts of domestic and sexual
violence also share common attributes, and victims experience
199. 42 U.S.C. § 10602(d)(3) (2000).
200. Compare, e.g., supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (recounting statistics
documenting scope of domestic and sexual violence), with Phil Hirschkom, New York
Reduces 9/11 Death Toll by 40, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/10/29/wtc.
deaths/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (reporting official death toll as 2752 in New
York City, including 127 airplane passengers, 20 crew members, and 10 hijackers). The
September 11 victims all suffered as a result of one act. Although domestic violence and
sexual assault impact victims through multiple attacks, both the nature of the attacks and their
impacts on victims share common traits across victim experiences.
201. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 139, at 469-72 (recounting reports of
psychological responses to the September 11 attacks).
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common emotional reactions."2  Both groups of victims may
experience Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and other psychological
reactions to the violence-induced trauma, and may require similar
types of services as a result."3
Third, the violence produces economic hardship for both groups
of victims.20" What distinguishes both groups from others who have
suffered economic hardship as a result of wrongdoing is that it may be
difficult, if not impossible, for victims of violence to recover damages
202. For example, although patterns of violence and abuse and the resulting responses
will vary from case to case, domestic violence can lead to post traumatic stress reactions,
including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY
AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 6-10
(May 1996), at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/batter.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004)
(summarizing psychological literature describing patterns of battering and patterns of
responses); JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 7-129 (1997) (describing psychological
reactions to trauma such as domestic and sexual violence). Dr. Lenore Walker introduced the
concept of "battered woman syndrome" to describe what she observed as the common
patterns of violence perpetrated by abusers and the common responses of victims to the
abuse. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN (1979). Her approach has been widely
criticized as inaccurately essentializing battered women's experience in a way that presents a
particularly inaccurate description of battered women of color. See, e.g., Sharon Angella
Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 193-95 (1991); Ammons, supra note 137, at 1015-16; Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 477, 505-06 (1996). Nevertheless,
theorists agree that common patterns describe abusive behaviors and victims' responses. See,
e.g., Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redeftnition ofBattered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1218-26 (1993); Evan
Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Women's Syndrome to Coercive
Control, 58 ALB. L. REv. 973, 992-1000 (1995). Victims of sexual assault similarly
experience common responses to the trauma. See Rebecca Campbell, Mental Health Issues
for Rape Survivors: Current Issues in Therapeutic Practice: What Are Rape Survivors
Experiencing and What Issues May They Present in Therapy, at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/
documents/commissioned/campbell/campbell.html#id2633290 (last visited Oct. 13, 2004)
(summarizing social science studies). Both domestic violence and sexual assault survivors,
like other crime victims, report higher rates of PTSD and depression than the general public.
NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, REPAIRING THE HARM: A NEW VISION FOR CRIME
COMPENSATION IN AMERICA 9-10 (2004). Crime victims generally "are at greater risk of
developing PTSD than victims of noncriminal traumatic events such as natural disasters." Id
at 9 (citing Dean G. Kilpatrick & Ron Acierno, Mental Health Needs of Crime Victims:
Epidemiology and Outcomes, 116 J. TRAuMATIC STRESS 119, 126 (2003)).
203. See CAMPBELL, supra note 202; Schneider, supra note 139, at 468-69.
204. As a result of the attacks, families of those killed reported an average income
drop of 40%, including all charitable and government assistance received as of the spring of
2002, and over half of the surviving spouses had no independent form of employment on the
day of the attack. McKINSEY & Co., A STUDY OF THE ONGOING NEEDS OF PEOPLE AFFECTED
BY THE WORLD TRADE CENTER DISASTER 12, available at http://www.9-
1 lusg.org/uploadFiles/index3.asp?page=REPSTUDIDX#critical (June 27, 2002) (last visited
Oct. 13, 2004). See hifra Part VA (discussing the economic ramifications of domestic and
sexual violence).
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from the offender. 5 Of course, survivors who have lost a family
member to an act of violence may avail themselves of a different range
of legal remedies than those available to individuals who themselves
are injured as a result of violence.2 6 Both groups, however, typically
cannot rely on insurance policies as a source of compensation.0 7
Notwithstanding these similarities-surviving violence,
experiencing shared trauma, losing income, and facing numerous
barriers to economic recovery-the September 11 terror attacks
undoubtedly can be seen as sui geneis because they were the first
large-scale terrorist attacks on American soil by foreign actors. In
contrast to more common crimes, the acts were beyond the risks we
ordinarily assume in the normal course of daily affairs.0 8 In addition,
terrorist attacks can be distinguished from "ordinary" crime and seen
as the fruit of a calculated, ideological campaign to instill fear,
suspicion, and violence."° Unlike many crimes, which are directed at
an individual, or committed seemingly at random, the September 11
attacks can be seen as being directed at all Americans." ° In that sense,
however, the attacks may not be dissimilar from gender-based and
other forms of hate crimes, which similarly inflict harm beyond the
individual, on the entire targeted community.2 '
205. See supra Part IVB.5 (addressing formal barriers to tort recovery for crime
victims); see also supra Part II.A (discussing the availability of restitution). Although claims
against the terrorists are not barred as a legal matter, the possibility of recovery is uncertain.
Compare, e.g., Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 E Supp. 2d 217, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding Iraq and the Al Qaeda defendants (Taliban, Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan) responsible, and awarding plaintiffs over $100 million); with Smith
v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y, 280 E Supp. 2d 314, 324 (S.D.N.Y 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs'
efforts to attach assets of the former Republic of Iraq, frozen at the beginning of the first Gulf
War, in order to pay the $100 million judgment), aff'4 346 E3d 264 (2d Cir. 2003). See
generally Pamela S. Falk, Show Them the Money: Victims of the Sept. 11 Attacks May
Wrest Some Monetary Victory from the Coffers of the Taliban Government, LEGAL TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2001, at 52 (detailing possibilities for recovering tort damages from terrorists);
Pamela S. Falk, Families of Missing Have Three Options, N.Y L.J., Nov. 27, 2001, at 5
(same).
206. For example, surviving family members may be able to recover under wrongful
death statutes, while those injured as a result of violence typically must rely on traditional tort
doctrines.
207. See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 121, 135-36
(2001) (detailing the unavailability of insurance for victims of domestic violence).
208. Issacharoff& Mansfield, supranote 178, at 4.
209. PETER H. SCHUCK, NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, SOME THOUGHTS ON
COMPENSATING VICTIMS 11 (May 2003), available at http://www.ncvc.org/nevc/AGPNet/
Components/documentViewer/Download.aspnx2?DocumentlD=32596 (last visited Oct. 13,
2004).
210. See Shapo, supra note 173, at 1259.
211. See, e.g., Sally E Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of
Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 16 (2000) (analogizing domestic violence and group-based
2004] 09
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The distinctions may appear clear when viewed through the lens
of the September 11 attacks. However, the difference between
terrorism and other crimes blurs when one considers other, more
insidious acts that may also be considered "terrorist." For example,
Israel has a longstanding and extensive benefits program for victims of
terrorism, and a newer, more limited program for victims of crime."2
In that country, the classification of an act as "terrorist" or a "crime" is
in many cases unclear and subject to varying interpretations."3 In a
broader sense, the analogy between domestic violence and terrorism is
even more direct. Domestic violence has been described as a form of
private terrorism, in recognition of the inherent similarities between the
two types of violence. "' Both operate on large scales, target
crime); Frederick M. Lawrence, The Pumshment of Hate.- Toward a Normative Theory of
Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REV. 320, 321 n.4 (1994) (defining "bias" crime); Lu-in
Wang, The Transforming Power of"Hate" Social Cognition Theory and the Harms ofBias-
Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 108-25 (1997) (discussing effects of "bias crimes");
Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex" Recognizing Gender-Based
Bias Crimes, 5:2 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 21, 24 (1994) (recognizing gender-based "bias"
crime); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (recognizing that bias
motivated crimes inflict "greater individual and societal harm" than nonbias motivated
crime).
212. Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation for Harm Caused by Terrorism:
Lessons Learned in the IsraeliExperience, 36 IND. L. REV. 336, 340 n.24 (2003).
213. Id For example, if a terrorist attacks someone he knows, whether an employer,
an intimate partner, or a cocriminal, it may be difficult to determine whether the act should be
characterized as a "crime" or a "terrorist" act. Id
214. See, e.g., Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women
Defendants: A Normative Construc4 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 335 & n.747 (2003)
(analogizing domestic violence to terrorist behavior). Social scientists have reached the same
conclusion. See Goldfarb, supra note 211, at 16 (identifying the "terroristic function" served
by group based violence, including gender-based violence, as it operates to intimidate not
only the individual, but also all other members of the group); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Disputing Male Sovereignty- On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 154
(2000) (describing gender based violence as "privately executed but socially systematic
terrorism"); Isabel Marcus, Refraining "'Domestic Violence": Terrorism in the Home, in THE
PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 11, 31 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne
Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (arguing that the violence commonly described as "domestic violence"
more accurately is described as terrorism); see also Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the
Home. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. (1990) (analogizing domestic violence
to terrorism); Michael P. Johnson & Janel M. Leone, The Differential Effects of Intimate
Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against
Women Survey, available at http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/m/p/mpj/JFI03.html
(forthcoming in J. FAm. IssUEs) (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (categorizing domestic violence
involving male domination of women as "intimate partner terrorism"); PURPLE BERETS,
FIGHTING DOMESTIC TERRORISM, at http://www.purpleberets.'org/violence-fightingdvhtml
(last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (same); CHAER ROBERT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE OTHER
TERRORISM, at www.denvergov.org/Women/templatel 13346.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2004)
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individuals based on their identity, and serve to intimidate a broader
community beyond the individual victim. "'
Thus, at least four elements are common to victims of terrorism
and victims of domestic and sexual violence: similar harm produced
through a violent, criminal act; infliction of harm on a wide scale;
economic ramifications; and the difficulty of private recovery. The
next sections will compare the goals and rationales that have led to
such disparate approaches for these not-so-dissimilar victims.
B. Program Goals and Ratonales
Crime victim compensation programs have received scant
theoretical examination since VOCA's enactment in 1984.216 This
section will revisit and assess the arguments that have been
propounded to support victim compensation programs in the wake of
renewed attention to compensation for crime victims in the aftermath
of September 11.
The most robust debate about publicly funded victim
compensation programs took place in the late 1950s and into the
1960s, the period preceding enactment of the Great Britain and New
Zealand programs and the first state programs in the United States.1 7
(same); LISA WALLACE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Is TERRORISM, at http://www.cfc.ky.gov/
cfconline/Oct2002/Rally.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (same).
215. See sources cited supra note 211.
216. One aspect of crime victim compensation programs that has generated substantial
debate is the question whether convicted criminals can profit from their crimes through
publications or other forms of speech. Numerous articles have addressed the Supreme
Court's decision in 1991 to strike New York's statute prohibiting convicted criminals from
profiting from their crimes as infringing their First Amendment expressive rights. See Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); see, e.g., Mario M.
Cuomno, The Crime Victm in a System of Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT
1, 15-19 (1992); Garrett Epps, Wising Up: "Son of Sam" Laws and the Speech and Press
Clauses, 70 N.C. L. REy. 493, 499 (1992); Robert Mazow, Simon & Schuster v. New York
State Crime Victims Board: Should the Supreme Court Have Invalidated New Yorks Son of
Sam Statute?, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 813 (1994); Kevin S. Reed, CriminalAnti-Profit Statutes
and the First Amendment: Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Board, 15
HAR. J.L. & PUB. POCY 1060, 1061 (1992). Only a few articles have addressed the general
structure and approach of victim compensation programs since their enactment. See, e.g.,
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Robbing the Rich to Feed the Poor? 3 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 261
(1999) (arguing that some federal victims of crime should not be precluded from
compensation under VOCA funded programs); Desmond S. Greer, A Tansatlantic
Perspective on the Compensation of Crime Wictins in the United States, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 333, 335 (1994) (comparing the U.S. system for crime victim compensation
with the crime victim compensation system of Great Britain); Smith, supm note 58, at 52-57
(recounting program scope and requirements as of the mid-1980s).
217. The debate over these programs gave rise to several important journal
publications in which scholars recounted the history of compensation programs and debated
TULANE LA WREVIEW
Various related rationales were propounded. For analytic purposes,
this section will group the rationales into the following categories:
(1) legal obligation, (2) social welfare, (3) shared risks, and (4) support
to the criminal justice system. Traces of all but the legal obligation
theory are reflected in current compensation programs. To these, the
9/11 Fund adds a "tort-replacement" rationale as an alternative
approach.21 This Part will examine the extent to which these
approaches advance the fundamental goals of compensation systems:
the dual purposes of replacing financial losses and making amends for
them.9 As this analysis will show, the "shared risk" and "tort
replacement" rationales hold the most promise as foundations for
future approaches to crime victim compensation.
1. Legal Obligation
One argument advanced in support of government-funded victim
compensation programs can be coined the "legal obligation" theory. It
ig based on the premise that the government has an absolute duty to
protect its citizens from crime."' As Justice Goldberg stated in a
prominent article advocating the development of victim compensation
programs: "The victim of a robbery or an assault has been denied the
'protection' of the laws in a very real sense, and society should assume
proposals. See, e.g., Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J.
PUB. L. 191 (1959); Symposium, Compensation to Victims of Personal Violence. An
Examination of the Scope of the Problem, 50 MINN. L. REv. 213 (1965-66); Symposium,
Governmental Compensation for Victims of Violence, 43 S.-CAL. L. REV. 5 (1970).
218. See supra notes 152-160 and accompanying text.
219. PETER CANE, ATYAH's ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 4 (6th ed.
1999). Crime victim compensation programs also can be seen as advancing some or all of
the following goals: corrective justice, distributive justice, deterrence, and moral affirmation.
SCHUCK, supra note 209, at 3. Programs advance corrective justice in that they require the
wrongdoer to recreate the equality that existed between the victim and offender prior to the
wrongful act. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); SCHUCK, supra note 209,
at 4; George P. Fletcher, Symposium, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3
BUFF. CRrm. L. REv. 51, 54 (1999); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IowA L. REv. 403,
407-09 (1992). The schemes also can be seen as a form of distributive justice in that they
involve a choice of criteria through which benefits are distributed to eligible recipients and in
that they establish a relationship between the victim, the wrongdoer, and the community. See,
e.g., JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 1-11 (1996); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 981 (1988).
Conceptually, the schemes can advance deterrence by requiring the perpetrator to bear some
of the costs of the injury, although the extent to which they would affect that goal is
necessarily limited by the limited fines and fees that comprise victim compensation funds.
They can also provide moral affirmation for the victim through a social recognition of the
wrongfulness of the act. See SCHUCK, supra note 209, at 7.
220. Lamborn, supra note 58, at 462; Schafer, supra note 40, at 58-59.
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some responsibility for making him whole."22' The theory rests on the
idea that the state has taken responsibility for prosecuting crimes out of
the hands of individuals by creating police forces, courts,. and
correctional institutions; by taxing citizens to maintain those
institutions; and by limiting citizens' abilities to arm and thereby
protect themselves.2 Fines and imprisonment, which take offenders
out of the workforce and therefore eliminate their earning capacities,
further limit victims' abilities to recover from offenders.223  The
argument resembles a classic assumption of duty theory: because the
state has undertaken the burden of protecting its citizens, it is liable to
reimburse citizens whom it fails to protect, and who have reasonably
relied on the state's performance of that duty.
In a variation on that argument, Professor Childres argued that
society is responsible for the costs of crime because "the failure of
police protection" is "a prerequisite to any crime., 2 ' He also reasoned
that because American institutions are "remarkabl[y] unresponsive" to
the causes of crime, their "minimal responsibility" extends to
"repairing the human damage that results."2 "6
Since the legal obligation rationale was raised in the early 1960s,
the approach it represents has been widely discredited in the United
States. Courts have rejected the notion of the state's legal
responsibility for harms caused by its failure to care for citizens.22'
221. Arthur J. Goldberg, Equality and GovernmentalActon, 39 N.YU. L. REv. 205,
224 (1964).
222. See Joe Hudson & Burt Galloway, Victim Compe sation. An Analysis of
Substantive Issues, iM CONSIDERING THE VICTIM, supra note 41, at 421, 421-22; James Brooks,
The Case for Creating Compensation Programs to Aid Victims of Violent Crime, 11 TULSA
L.J. 477, 479 (1976); Childres, supra note 10, at 455-56 (citing failure of police protection as
justifying societal responsibility for losses that result from crime as part of a "moral
argument" in support of crime victim compensation programs); Fry, supra note 62, at 193
(citing state responsibility for the "occasional failure to protect" in light of state prohibition of
citizens "going armed in self-defence"); Lambom, supra note 58, at 462; Schafer, supra note
40, at 58-59.
223. Lambom, supra note 58, at 462.
224. Id. at 462-63 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965)).
225. Childres, supra note 10, at 456.
226. Id
227. Generally, the state has been held to have no duty to protect individuals in its care.
See DeShaney v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). However, courts have found
law enforcement officials to have a duty to provide police protection in some limited
circumstances, for example, when police create a "special relationship" with individuals, such
as domestic violence victims, by placing them in more dangerous situations than they would
have been otherwise. See, e.g., Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990)
(upholding a claim against a batterer by the family of a murdered woman and child based on
allegations that the police chief affirmatively told officers not to take action against the
batterer who subsequently killed them). But see, e.g., Pinder v. Johnson, 54 E3d 1169, 1175
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Although nothing precludes its resurrection, this theory is not likely to
support compensation programs in the near future.
2. Compensation Schemes as Social Welfare
Victim compensation programs can also be justified under a
social welfare theory predicated on the idea that a state owes a
humanitarian obligation to victims of crime.228 Although social welfare
is not the primary expressed rationale for the 9/11 Fund, it is one of the
more commonly articulated rationales underlying the state victim
compensation programs. Advocates supporting government-
sponsored victim compensation programs in the 1960s premised their
arguments to a large extent on a social welfare rationale.9 They
viewed crime victim compensation as an outgrowth of modem
democracy's moral responsibility to help those who are sick and
(4th Cir. 1995) (finding no special relationship despite allegations that police assured the
batterer's former girlfriend that she was safe to go to work and leave her children home alone
because the batterer was in jail, but instead released the batterer, who went to her home and
burned it down, killing her three children inside), cert denied 516 U.S. 994 (1995). Courts
have also found municipality liability based on a showing that the police department's
treatment of domestic violence victims violated their equal protection rights. See, e.g.,
Macias v. lhde, 219 E3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding a claim by a battered
woman's estate that the police deprived her of equal protection by providing her with inferior
police protection on account of her status as a woman, a Latina, and a victim of domestic
violence). Notably, in November 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
a case in which the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that a mother whose children
were killed by their father, against whom she had a court-issued restraining order that the
police refused to enforce, contrary to the governing state statute, had a procedural due process
right to have the order enforced. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 E3d 1093 (10th Cir.
2004), cert. gmrntea 73 U.S.L.W. 3271 (Nov. 2, 2004). The outcome of that case may
determine whether procedural due process may give rise to state obligations to victims of
violence. See geneally, e.g., PETER H. ScHUCK, SUNG GOVERNMENT (1983) (presenting
theories supporting government liability for wrongdoing).
228. Schafer, supm note 40, at 59 (viewing compensation programs as calling on the
"conscience of the twentieth century man who cannot tolerate the misery of the helpless");
accodGoldberg, supm note 221, at 224; Smith, supm note 58, at 62-63.
229. See Lamborn, supra note 58, at 464. This argument sometimes is referred to as
the "moral argument" in support of compensation. See, e.g., Childres, supra note 10, at 455-
56 (citing the state's partial responsibility for an incarcerated criminal's inability to
compensate the victim). As Professor Childres argues, aside from the criminal, the state is
the party "next most responsible" for the crime. Id at 456; see also Smith, supra note 58, at
63-66 (articulating and critiquing the "welfare theory" based on the idea that a state owed a
"humanitarian obligation" to victims of crime). Some theorists worried that victim
compensation systems would be duplicative of social welfare programs. See, e.g., Smith,
supra note 58, at 68. Others contended that the two programs served distinct purposes. See,
e.g., Childres, supra note 10, at 462 (distinguishing social welfare from victim compensation
programs on the basis, inter alia, that they rest on different rationales and address distinct




injured.23° In Great Britain, Margaret Fry argued that society's
"collective responsibility for sickness and injury" and its "modem"
systems of sharing the cost of social risks, warranted public provision
of assistance for victims.23 ' She invoked the work of eighteenth-
century philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who reasoned that offenders
should be held responsible in the first instance for compensating
victims for the losses that result from crime, but that if the offender
lacks assets, victims should be paid "out of the public treasury, because
it is an object of public good and the security of all is interested in it."232
As Bentham framed the problem, the community ought to be taxed to
repair the damage caused because it bears responsibility for violent
offenses.233 Along those same lines, Justice Goldberg argued that the
U.S. government should compensate crime victims because crime
reflects society's inattention to poverty and social injustice."' Any
program derived from these principles and paid for by public funds
could be seen as a form of distributive justice, with the compensation
program determining the criterion by which the burden of crime would
be distributed.35
Nevertheless, the United States implicitly rejected a social
welfare approach by devising a funding stream that did not require
public funding, which is generally the hallmark of a social welfare
program. 36 In this sense, the state programs and the 9/11 Fund bear an
inverse relationship to government funding. Formally, the 9/11 Fund
invokes private law tort principles, and is not framed in terms of social
welfare, but awards are financed by government funds instead of the
defendant in a tort action. " By contrast, much of the rhetoric
justifying state compensation programs rests in large part on social
230. LeRoy G. Schultz, The Violated: A Proposal to Compensate Victims of Violent
Crime, in CONSIDERING THE VICTIM, supia note 41, at 130, 132-33; Fry, supra note 62, at 192;
Schafer, supra note 40, at 59. The British system, in which general tax dollars support crime
victim compensation programs, reflects this approach. Schafer, supra, note 40, at 61; McGee,
supm note 41, at 69.
231. Fry, supranote 62, at 192.
232. Id.
233. Jeremy Bentham, Political Rem edies for the Evil of Offenses (1838), repaintedin
CONSIDERING THE VICTIM, supra note 41, at 29, 42. In this sense, the social welfare rationale
is related to the legal duty theory described above.
234. Goldberg, supra note 221, at 225.
235. See Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive
Justice, 77 IOwA L. REV. 515, 536 (1992); Weinrib, supa note 219, at 407-08.
236. See supa notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 156, 175-180 and accompanying text.
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welfare principles, although the U.S. programs rely almost exclusively
on private, not government resources, for funding.238
The contrast is more stark when viewed through the lens of
public perception: from a victim's perspective, the 9/11 Fund and the
state crime victim compensation programs both offer funding to cover
expenses resulting from similar losses, but the amount of available
compensation and the depth of program resources varies tremendously.
The explanation that the disparity is based on September 11 victims'
waiver of their rights to bring lawsuits that have minimal chances of
recovery may have little resonance to the victim of domestic or sexual
violence who also faces minimal chances of recovering in tort but has
no comparable government program available as an alternative source
of tort-type damages."'
3. Support to the Criminal Justice System
Another line of argument supporting crime victim compensation
programs posits that helping the victim will advance the criminal
justice system's essential functions of promoting prosecutions and
convictions.24° This idea has several facets and deep historical roots.
As early as 600 B.C., communities began to compensate crime victims
when efforts to apprehend the criminal failed, as an incentive to
improve prosecutorial efforts."' More modem arguments echoed this
view that crime victim compensation could be a means of encouraging
victims to cooperate with law enforcement officials in the prosecution
of the crime."" Justice Goldberg went so far as to suggest that hinging
victim compensation on prompt reporting to law enforcement would
reduce the crime rate as well as help law enforcement with
prosecutions."3
238. See supm note 229 and accompanying text.
239. SeeinfraPart IV.B.5.
240. See infa notes 242-247 and accompanying text.
241. Childres, supranote 10, at 444.
242. Smith, supra note 58, at 68-71. However, Professor Smith argues that empirical
data suggest that compensation does not effectively encourage victims to participate. She
cites the fact that because only a small percentage of victims file for compensation, the
availability of compensation does not have a "spillover" effect onto other victims. Id. at 70.
In addition, she recognizes that cooperating with law enforcement may contribute to the
difficulties crime victims already face in coping with violence, as it exacerbates issues such
as lost wages, time away from daily responsibilities, and emotional distress resulting from the
crime. Id.
243. Arthur J. Goldberg, Preface, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1970) (introducing a
symposium issue on "Governmental Compensation for Victims of Violence").
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The drafters of VOCA appear to have subscribed to this theory as
well. The congressional findings accompanying the final version of
VOCA reflect Congress's concern that public respect for the law would
be diminished if steps were not taken to help victims. 2" The findings
also highlighted Congress's hope that the compensation program
would advance the criminal justice system's need for victim
cooperation. 5 VOCA's requirements that compensation recipients
must report the crime to the police and cooperate in the prosecution
concretizes this theory in a very practical way.24' The concept
represents a laudable goal. However, given factors such as the modest
amount of available awards and the relative lack of awareness of the
programs among victims, it is hard to imagine that the program itself
would have a substantial impact on victims' willingness to cooperate
with law enforcement.47
Another way to view the relationship between crime victim
compensation and the criminal justice system is that compensation
programs in the United States evolved out of a sense that crime victims
were forgotten in the criminal justice system.4 8 Some have pro-
pounded an "anti-alienation" argument, which sees compensation as a
way of addressing the concern that victims who have suffered the
hardship of crime and the ordeal of cooperating in a criminal
prosecution will become disillusioned with society unless they are
compensated for their losses.249 Like the argument above, the modest
award amounts and lack of program visibility reduce the extent to
which this theory may actually bear on victims' view of the criminal
justice process. Thus, while the program undoubtedly evolved as an
offshoot of the criminal justice system and holds the potential of
enhancing it, the extent to which victim compensation may actually
advance its interests is likely minimal at best.
244. The ictims of Crime Assistance Act of 1984: Hearing on S.2423 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 9 (1984) [hereinafter VOCA Hearing].
245. Id at 10.
246. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(2) (2000) (requiring victims
to cooperate with law enforcement's reasonable requests).
247. See supm Part III.
248. Roland, supra note 58, at 35. It is therefore no surprise that crime victim
programs began to be developed at the same time that the "War on Crime" received
increasing attention.
249. Schafer, supra note 40, at 59.
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4. Risk Spreading and Cost Sharing
An additional way of viewing crime victim compensation
programs is as a way of distributing the costs of crime across society.25
This argument has continuing and valuable resonance, and bears
review in light of our current knowledge about the economic impact of
crime."' The theory figured prominently in arguments by early
advocates of compensation programs. For example, Fry rested her
advocacy in support of victim compensation programs on the idea that
"modem" society's practice of sharing risks of many kinds should be
extended to sharing risks resulting from crime.252 She urged a system
of public insurance analogous to workers compensation programs,
funded by tax dollars, to cover a risk "to which each [citizen] is
exposed"53  Other theorists similarly argued that criminal violence
was "endemic" to society, and that losses resulting from such endemic
harms should be spread.25'
The state victim compensation programs embody an innovative
approach to compensation that can be seen as building on this cost-
sharing approach. The programs create a form of social insurance in
which offenders pay the costs victims incur as a result of violent
crimes. "' That this is accomplished without requiring victims to
engage in litigation addresses the formidable barriers to victims'
abilities to recover damages directly from offenders that particularly
affect victims of domestic and sexual violence. 5' The use of offender
250. See, e.g., in/ia notes 252-254 and accompanying text.
251. See infiPartVA.
252. Fry, supm note 62, at 192.
253. Id at 193. The writings of Jeremy Bentham support Fry's approach. He argued
that while the best source of compensation for losses resulting from crime is the offender, the
cost of losses that the offender cannot pay should be borne by the state because "it is an
object of public benefit; the security of all is concerned." Bentham, supa note 233, at 39.
254. Childres, supra note 10, at 457. Professor Childres reasoned that this theory
would give rise to one of two solutions: state compensation or compulsory insurance. Id He
rejected compulsory insurance as unaffordable to many citizens, and referenced the failure of
private insurance in the workers' compensation context to conclude that victim compensation
should be funded by the state. Id. at 457-59; see also Smith, supra note 58, at 66-68. Note,
however, that some theorists worried that victim compensation systems would be duplicative
of social welfare programs. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 58, at 68.
255. The legislative history proposing that the program would be funded in large part
by defendant fines and fees reflects Congress's intent to implement a distributive justice
approach. See S. REP. No. 98-497, at 14 (1984). For example, Senator Thurmond, in urging
Congress to approve VOCA, emphasized the use of profits obtained by criminals to help
make the victims whole. VOCA Hearing, supa note 244, at 8-9 (statement of Sen.
Thurmond); see also Lamborn, supra note 58, at 450-54; McGee, supra note 41, at 68-69;
Wolfgang, supra note 58, at 229-30.
256. See inf-a notes 277-284 and accompanying text.
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fines and fees also advances the interests of corrective justice to some
extent, as the offender is held accountable for repaying some of the
losses to the victim.25 To the degree that defendant fines and fees
comprise funds used to pay victims, the scheme may have some
deterrent effects as well, although it is hard to imagine that the
amounts recovered through fines, fees, and restitution would be
sufficiently substantial to effect any change in offender behavior.258
Thus, the state programs reflect and arguably advance a vision of
distributive justice that, while powerful, is incomplete. One aspect of
distributive justice is that a system of allocating resources addresses
the relationship between actors and their community."9 Accordingly, a
more complete distributive justice vision would include contributions
from government to help fill the inevitable shortfalls that result both
from the limitations of fines and fees and from the inadequacy of
traditional mechanisms for compensation, namely tort recovery and
restitution."
The 9/11 Fund advances a somewhat different vision of
distributive justice, perhaps unwittingly, by the fact that the
government has assumed the cost of victims' losses resulting from the
terror attacks. Government funding could be defended as a way to
spread the costs of the unexpected attack and to shield particular
industries and individuals from bearing the cost when they played no
role in creating the risk. However, the calculation of awards
approximating tort damages rather than awards more closely tracking
disaster relief or emergency payments is unprecedented for a
government program absent an admission of state liability, and
therefore is difficult, if not impossible, to defend and replicate.
257. Initially, objections were raised to pooling defendant fines, based on the argument
that an offender should not be held accountable for the losses resulting from crime committed
by another defendant. NIJ COMPENSATION ANALYSIS, supra note 114, at 121. However, these
arguments have been rejected by courts, which have upheld fines on criminal defendants as
long as they were not "excessive" or "harsh" or civil in nature. See State v. Champe, 373 So.
2d 874, 880 (Fla. 1978); McKay v. Las Vegas, 789 P2d 584, 586-87 (Nev. 1990).
258. Defendant fines range from $3, for traffic fines and misdemeanors, to $10,000
for child pornography. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE
LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO FUNDING FOR VICTIMS' SERVICES 1-2, at
http://wwwojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publicationsbulletinslegalseriesbulletin9/ncj 199477.pdf (last
visited Oct. 13, 2004).
259. Benson, supa note 235, at 536.
260. See Frank W. Miller, Compensation for Cnimes of Criminal Violence: A Round
Table, 8 J. PUB. L. 203, 207-08 (1959).
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5. Compensation Funds as Tort Substitutes
A final perspective would view the compensation programs as a
substitute for damage awards victims of violence might otherwise be
able to obtain through the tort system. Under this view, government
might devise a compensation program for victims when tort damages
are unavailable, or, as with the 9/11 Fund, when the government offers
incentives for individuals to waive their rights to tort litigation. As
discussed above, although not a perfect fit, the 9/11 Fund can most
readily be seen as a substitute for the tort system, given Congress's
concern for the airline carriers' and other potential defendants'
financial stability and the resulting requirement that 9/11 Fund
eligibility be predicated on claimants' waivers of their rights to sue.26'
Consequently, 9/11 Fund awards were structured to induce victims to
forego their tort claims.62 Award amounts include the basic elements
of tort recovery: economic damages, including lost future earnings,
and noneconomic damages, defined broadly to include pain and
suffering and emotional distress.263 However, the program deviates in a
fundamental conceptual way from the bedrock of traditional tort
precepts--deterrence-because none of the potential defendants in a
tort action make financial contributions to the 9/11 Fund."4 Of course,
because the 9/11 Fund provides a benefit outside the tort system, it
need not comply with the tort system's theoretical foundations.
Nevertheless, it seems contradictory to justify large awards based on
their equivalence to tort damages while not meeting the underlying
concern of deterrence that drives the tort system's award calculations.
Scholars have identified ways in which the tort system would
have proved inadequate for September 11 victims if it had been the
only available avenue of recourse. Alexander has suggested that a tort-
based approach is poorly suited to this type of public, mass disaster."'
She observed that the hijackers, who were the real "culprits," were
likely to be unavailable, and it seemed unfair and ill-suited to the
public interest to hold other possible negligent actors such as the
261. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at
49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note (West Supp. 2004)); see supra notes 153-181 and accompanying
text.
262. See supra notes 151, 158-166 and accompanying text.
263. ATSSSA § 402.
264. Rabin and others have suggested that the government might be the appropriate
source of funding for the program given the evidence indicating that the government was in
fact negligent in failing to take appropriate steps to prevent the September 11 attacks in light
of information it had available at the time. See discussion supra note 178.
265. Alexander, supra note 39, at 636-54.
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airlines or premises owners liable, particularly because they also had
suffered large losses. 6 Rabin has raised several other limitations.
First, the prospect of the airlines' potential insolvency would have left
victims without meaningful remedies, assuming the unavailability of
insurance coverage."' Second, the protracted nature of tort litigation
would have imposed financial burdens and emotional stress on a group
of victims who already faced considerable burdens.268 Third, the
individual assessment of damage and loss that characterizes the tort
process would have led to perceptions of arbitrariness in a community
that shared a special identity, unlike many other tort claimants.269
Others have criticized the 9/11 Fund's use of a tort-based approach on
the grounds that the use of government funds to pay for tort-scale
damages is unprecedented and difficult to justify unless the
government itself was releasing funds to compensate victims for its
own role in the attacks."'
Unlike the 9/11 Fund, the state compensation programs bear no
formal relationship to tort schemes. 7 ' The state programs do not
require victims to waive their rights to bring tort claims.272 Award
amounts are not linked to tort recovery.273 However, as in the case of
the 9/11 Fund, the state programs emerged, at least in part, because the
tort system proved to be ineffective as a source of recovery for crime
victims.274 In this way, the state programs can be seen as conceptually
similar to the 9/11 Fund, providing an alternative means through which
victims of violent crime can recover the costs incurred as a result.
Some have justified victim compensation programs as filling the
gap left when existing public and private approaches fall short."'
266. Id at 637.
267. Rabin, supra note 77, at 771.
268. Id.
269. Ad at 772.
270. See discussion supa note 178.
271. See supa Part lI.B.2.
272. See infia note 277 and accompanying text.
273. However, those who bring successful claims must repay amounts recovered that
duplicate state program awards as a way to prevent duplicate recovery and safeguard the state
programs as the payor of last resort. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
274. Lamborn, supra note 58, at 450-51; McGee, supra note 41, at 70; Smith, supra
note 58, at 60-61.
275. See Fry, supra note 62, at 191-94 (citing inadequacy of restitution payments as
justification for government supported victim compensation programs); Miller, supra note
260, at 208; cf Lambom, supra note 58, at 450, 462-63 (arguing that the limitations of
traditional remedial measures, combined with the government's duty to assist crime victims
and a commitment to social welfare, justify government supported crime victim
compensation programs).
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Under that conception, the extent to which crime victims can recover
from the perpetrator is significant. Restitution seems to offer a ready
alternative to tort that could achieve the goal of offender payments to
victims without requiring victims to engage directly with the
perpetrator. It furthers the goal of deterrence by holding offenders
accountable, and advances corrective justice by requiring payment by
the offender to the victim. However, as discussed above, restitution is
widely recognized as an inadequate means to ensure victims of full
recovery of their losses.276
An approach to victim compensation that acknowledges the
limitations of the tort and restitution systems holds particular promise
for victims of domestic and sexual violence. Of course, some
domestic violence victims have recovered tort damages from their
abusers. 7  But systemic reasons prevent many from accessing
recovery through the tort system. First, many victims, particularly
those who are poor, have difficulty obtaining lawyers, and may not
know that they may have legal claims."8 The lack of insurance
coverage reduces the likelihood that attorneys will bring tort claims
even when victims identify claims and talk with lawyers."9 In
addition, domestic violence and sexual assault victims may have
unique reasons to avoid voluntary litigation with the perpetrators of the
crime."' Victims of domestic and sexual violence frequently go to
great lengths to minimize their interactions with the offenders,
including obtaining legal protections such as protective orders.28'
276. See supra Part II.A.
277. See, e.g., LEONARD I. KARP & CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY
VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SExUAL ABUSE § 1.20 (2003); see also Clare Dalton, Domestic
Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce- Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEw ENG. L. REV.
319, 327-28 (1997); Wriggins, supra note 207. In one recent and highly unusual case, a
Massachusetts court awarded a domestic violence victim $9 million in recovery from her
abusive boyfriend who broke her neck. Associated Press, Domestic Violence Victim Awarded
$9 Million in Action Against Abuser, available at http://www.ohiodvresources.org/atinfo/
news/article.php?id=447 (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
278. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Dep't Awards over $23
Million for Civil Legal Assistance to Victims of Domestic Violence (Oct. 19, 2000), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/pressreleases/2000/ojp000114.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004)
(announcing civil legal assistance grants to help battered women address civil legal needs
such as obtaining protection orders, divorce, spousal and child support, child custody, and
recognizing that "jmraany domestic violence victims, particularly those with low incomes, do
not have access to, or cannot afford legal services or representation") (quoting Bonnie
Campbell, Director of the Justice Department's Violence Against Women Office).
279. Wriggins, supra note 207, at 135-37.
280. Id. at 141-44.
281. See Julie Goldscheid, Advancing Equality in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 11
J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 417, 422 (2003). While protective orders are most common in
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Batterers routinely use civil proceedings such as custody and child
support matters to perpetrate the abuse.282 Additional litigation, which
ensures more contact, may be the last thing a survivor wants to
initiate."' For those reasons, the tort system may be systemically
underutilized by and unavailing for these victims.
24
Aside from efforts to hold the perpetrator accountable, some
domestic and sexual violence victims successfully have brought tort
claims against negligent third parties. For example, some victims have
recovered in cases against landlords for premises liability and
negligent security,2 5 or against employers for negligent hiring and
supervision.28  For crime victims generally, efforts to hold gun
manufacturers liable for losses resulting from violent crime may be
emerging as a viable means of recovery.8 7 To the extent these actors
cases of domestic violence, they may be used in cases of sexual violence as well. The two
categories of crime cannot be so readily distinguished, as over 60% of sexual abuse cases are
committed by someone the victim knows. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIME CHARACTERISTICS: TRENDS IN VIOLENT VICTIMIZATIONS 1973-2002, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj/gov/bjs/cvict-c.htm#relate (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (reporting that in
2002, more than six in ten rape or sexual assault victims stated the offender was an intimate,
relative, friend, or acquaintance); TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 5, at iv (finding that 64%
of women who reported being raped, physically assaulted, or stalked since age eighteen were
victimized by a current or former intimate partner).
282. See, e.g., Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in Custody Disputes when One
Parent Abuses the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1113, 1117-21 (1996) (addressing
batterers' use of custody battles to perpetuate abuse); Stark, supra note 202, at 1018
(highlighting batterers' misuse of custody battles to perpetuate abuse).
283. SeeGoldscheid, supm note 281, at 422.
284. See Wriggins, supra note 207, at 133-51. Jennifer Wriggins has proposed a no-
fault insurance fund for domestic violence victims based on the same recognition that
domestic violence victims systemically underutilize the tort system. Id. at 152-69.
285. See, e.g., Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 176 Cal. Rptr. 494, 500 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981) (recognizing landlord liability for rape in a building if the landlord failed to
exercise reasonable care); Ortiz v. Housing Auth., 22 E Supp. 2d 15, 20-21 (E.D.N.Y 1998)
(upholding $3 million damages award against a landlord for negligence leading to a rape at
gunpoint); Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 614 N.E.2d 723, 726-28 (N.Y 1993)
(recognizing landlord liability for negligence that may have led to rape in a housing authority
building). See generally Leslie Bender, Is Tort Law Male?." Foreseeability Analysis and
Property Managers'Liability for Third-Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313
(1993) (illustrating male bias in tort law through analysis of a Tennessee Supreme Court
decision affirming summary judgment in favor of a property manager whose alleged
negligence resulted in the rape of a tenant).
286. See, e.g., LEGAL MOMENTUM, THE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF
WORKING WOMEN 7-10 (2002), at http://www.legalmomentum.org/html/pub/pubs/
CreatingSolutions.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (citing cases of employer liability).
287. See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative
InstitutionalAnaysi, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1247 (2000) (discussing the role of private litigation
in shaping public policy regarding the gun industry); Timothy D. Lytton, Tort ClaimsAgainst
Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injunes: Defiming a Suitable Role for the Tort System
in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 Mo. L. RE. 1 (2000) (same).
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are held accountable through tort, portions of the damages award or
settlement could be designated to be contributed to the crime victims'
fund.288 These efforts reflect promising approaches to increasing the
accountability of parties whose negligence played a role in facilitating
the violence that could contribute to victim compensation funding if
such payments became more commonplace.
C Future Directions
The question whether to dedicate public funds to assisting victims
of crime-whether they are victims of terrorism, domestic violence,
sexual assault, hate crimes, terrorism, or other crimes-may be an
essentially political judgment about how scarce resources should be
allocated. The public's willingness to dedicate an unprecedented
amount of funds to assist victims of the September 11 attacks
undoubtedly says something about our shared sense of compassion in
a moment of national shock, anger, and grief. However, it is hard to
justify the absence of an analogous publicly supported compensation
program that similarly reflects a shared sense of shock, anger, and
grief about the systemic and enduring violence of domestic and sexual
abuse."9 As an exemplar program for victims of crime, the 9/11 Fund
illuminates the frequently unmet financial and practical needs victims
of violence constantly face. The compassionate approach to victims
reflected by the 9/11 Fund underscores the importance of addressing
victims' needs with a minimum of barriers and bureaucracy.
Assuming that a traditional view of social welfare alone will not
justify future programs, two of the approaches discussed above offer
the most promise as foundations for future initiatives. The systemic
unavailability of the tort system provides a strong argument for making
288. For example, the Attorney General of New York sought to have payments from a
settlement with gun manufacturers made to the New York State Crime Victims Board to
ensure that the funds would go to victims. Raymond Hemandez, 2 Gun Companies hn New
York Talks, N.Y TIMES, July 21, 1999, at A 1.
289. Professor Joel Eisen suggests that the universality of September 11 distinguishes
it from other contexts in which trauma has been linked with social reform. Joel B. Eisen, The
Trajectory of 'Normal" After 9/11: Trauma Recovery and Post-Traumatic Societal
Adaptation, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 499, 599 (2003). He compared September 11 with
other movements in which social change has been associated with trauma, such as the
women's movement and the holocaust, and argued that those movements, in contrast to
September 11, did not produce widespread advocacy because the trauma victims (e.g.,
survivors of domestic and sexual violence) challenged established mainstream beliefs. Id.
This argument reflects the flip side of the argument presented here that bias against the victim




compensation programs available to victims for whom traditional
sources of compensation, such as the tort system, will be inadequate.
The cost-sharing approach exemplified by the state compensation
programs and VOCA most effectively advances a form of distributive
justice that leverages perpetrator responsibility and minimizes public
expense. An approach that incorporated the "compassionate"
approach to victims of the 9/11 Fund into the cost sharing funding
mechanism of the state compensation programs would go a long way
to serving these victims, whose needs otherwise may remain
unaddressed.
V LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
This study of contrasting victim compensation programs reveals
several shortcomings in the existing approaches. First, victims' actual
unmet financial needs have not been fully considered in the
formulation of public compensation programs. For domestic and
sexual violence victims, empirical data bolsters the case for public
support because it describes the ways in which violence produces
barriers to economic independence. It shows that failing to provide
compensation for the losses that result from the violence will
exacerbate victims' hardships, and may even jeopardize victims' safety.
Second, the stark contrast between the generous and unquestioned
support afforded the September 11 victims and our ambivalent and
modest response to domestic and sexual violence survivors raises the
question whether the historic and enduring bias that has infused our
response to those victims may play a role in the divergent approaches
to compensation. Finally, the contrast between the two programs raises
important questions about the implications of such different treatment,
and supports future initiatives that minimize, rather than reinscribe,
historic biases.
A. Grounding Prognam in Data: Learning fom Social Science
Empirical data quantifying victims' economic needs following a
violent crime advances the question of whether the risks and costs of
crime should be spread by describing what those costs are. As initially
articulated, the victim compensation proposals rested on a relatively
general conception of those risks and costs. For example, Fry
discussed "sharing [the] risks" of crime much like other social costs
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are shared through mechanisms of insurance.2" However, she did not
detail either the type of financial assistance needed by victims or the
risks to which they are exposed in the absence of that support.
291
Justice Goldberg recognized some of these particulars when he
discussed the "burden of medical expenses, lost wages, and related
expenses," victims incur as a result of crime.292 However, the
arguments remained general as the parameters of the economic losses
victims suffer were not explicitly enumerated.
More recent empirical data about victims' needs fill in the picture
left open in the initial debates and underscore the importance of
ensuring compensation to cover the economic losses resulting from
crime. A recent National Institute of Justice study of victims of violent
crimes reported that victims suffered many financial losses as a result
of the crime, ranging from unreimbursed medical expenses, to lost
property, to lost days of work. 3 The study found that less than a
quarter of the victims were aware of the state victim compensation
programs, and even fewer applied. 9' Nonwhites in particular reported
that their needs for practical assistance in the aftermath of the crime
remained unmet.9 5 Of those who suffered economic losses, nearly
90% paid for them out of their own pocket. " Over 35% of victims
who were employed lost days of work following the crime, and over
60% of those lost income as a result. "7 Victims themselves regard
practical financial assistance as key to their recovery from crimes, and
one of the most important victim services available. "8
A similar study focusing on the costs of intimate partner violence
found that over 20% of victims who were raped and over 17% of those
physically assaulted by an intimate partner lost time from paid work.29"
Victims who were either raped or physically assaulted lost an average
290. Fry, supra note 62, at 191-92 (drawing an analogy to compulsory no-fault auto
insurance and proposing a general tax on every citizen to cover the "risk" of crime to which
each was exposed).
291. Id. at 192-93.
292. Goldberg, supra note 243, at 2.
293. Brickman, supra note 129, at 36-38.
294. Id. at 39-40.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 37.
297. Id. at 38-39.
298. See Davis, supra note 53, at 499.
299. NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMiATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 19 (2003), athttp://www.cdc.gov/neipe/pub-res/pubs.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
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of seven to eight days of paid work as a result of the crime."' The
overall value of rape victims' lost productivity resulting from lost days
of work has been estimated to be over $580 million each year."'
Victims of intimate partner violence overall lost a total of nearly $150
million a year in associated medical expenses, broken or stolen
property, and lost pay."' Those costs figure prominently in individuals'
lives and their abilities to recover from the crimes.
The case may be particularly acute for victims of domestic
violence and sexual assault, who together comprise close to a majority
of the cases currently filed with the state crime victim compensation
boards.0 In addition to the costs itemized above, these victims face
even more stark barriers to recovering from the offender due to fear of
retaliation and continued abuse.3  Domestic violence victims'
financial dependence on their abusers may prevent them from leaving
their batterers.0 Studies increasingly document the economic toll
domestic and sexual violence takes on its victims. Between 50% and
85% of battered women reporting missing work because of the
abuse. '30 Between 24% and 52% of surveyed battered women lost
their jobs, at least in part, due to the abuse. 7 One recent study
300. Id. Unfortunately, this study did not inquire whether victims were paid for those
lost days of work.
301. Idat40tbl. 12.
302. GREENFELD ETAL., supra note 56, at 21.
303. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
304. The fear of retaliation applies to sexual assault as well as domestic violence since
over 70% of sexual assaults are committed by individuals known to the victim. See studies
cited supra note 281.
305. See, e.g., Jody Raphael & Richard M. Tolman, Thapped in Poverty6, Trapped by
Abuse.- New Evidence Documenting the Relationship Between Domestic Violence and
Welfare (Apr. 1997), available at http://www.ssw.umich.edu/trapped/pubs-trapped.pdf (last
visited Oct. 13, 2004) (documenting the relationship between violence and poverty); Laura
Dugan, Daniel Nagin & Richard Rosenfeld, Do Domestic Violence Services Save Lives,
250 NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE 20, 22 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/
jrO00250f.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (reporting that reductions in Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits have been associated with an increase in intimate
partner violence, while an increase in benefits may reduce the risk).
306. LOUISE LAURENCE & ROBERTA SPALTER-ROTH, INST. FOR WOMEN'S POL'Y
RESEARCH, MEASURING THE COSTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THE COST-
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS: AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER
RESEARCH 25 (1996) (reporting studies).
307. THOMAS MOORE & VICKY SELKOWE, INST. FOR WISCONSIN'S FUTURE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE VICTIMS IN TRANSITION FROM WELFARE To WORK: BARRIERS TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY
AND THE W-2 RESPONSE 1 (Sept. 1999), at http://www.wisconsinsfuture.org/publications/
workingfamilies/DomesticViolenceSummary.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004) (finding
approximately 30%); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS 19 (Nov. 1998), at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov (citing several studies) (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
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indicates that reductions in economic assistance increases battered
women's likelihood of being killed by their abusive partners."8 Sexual
assault has similar effects. As Congress noted in enacting the 1994
Violence Against Women Act, nearly 50% of sexual assault victims
lose their jobs in the aftermath of the crimes. 09 An unpublished study
of sexual assault survivors who sought services from a victim services
agency similarly found that over 75% of employed victims lost income
or had to take time off as a result of the attacks." ' Access to
compensation for the losses resulting from the abuse can make a
decided difference in victims' abilities to recover.
B. Puting the Programs in Context: Examining the Peistence of
Bias
The difference in public sentiment regarding the September 11
victims and victims of crimes such as domestic and sexual violence
recalls other debates about "deserving" versus "undeserving"
beneficiaries of public assistance."' There was never any question that
victims of the September 11 attacks were anything but "innocent"
victims and therefore deserving of sympathy and support. If this were
the justification for the compensation programs' structures, it should
apply as well to the state victim compensation programs, which by
statutory requirement authorize awards only to "innocent" victims."2
However, victims of other crimes, particularly those involving
domestic violence, sexual assault, or other forms of bias-motivated
violence, have traditionally been viewed with suspicion. For example,
Professor Henry Weihofen invoked the most traditional and outdated
stereotypes about rape victims in his opposition to early proposals to
308. Dugan, Nagin & Rosenfeld, supra note 305, at 22.
309. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993) (citing Elizabeth Ellis, Beverly Atkeson &
Karen Calhoun, An Assessment of the Long Term Reaction to Rape, 90 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH.
263, 264 (1981)).
310. Safe Horizon, Rape and Sexual Assault: Effects of Incident on Employment and
School (July 2004) (on file with author).
311. See MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR 13-17 (1989); Joel F Handler,
"Constructing the Political Spectacle.'" The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and
Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 944 (1990); Amy L. Wax,
Something for Nothing: Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Requirements, 52 EMORY L.J. 1, 2
(2003); see also, e.g., MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES 139-57 (1963) (describing societal neglect of the poor and the failure of antipoverty
programs to help the invisible poor); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 183-247 (1971) (describing the
myriad ways in which social welfare programs control the poor).
312. See supra notes 84-117 and accompanying text.
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enact victim compensation programs.313  He argued that rape
accusations
are very frequently made by women who are caught in the act of
fornication, or who are seeking compensation, marriage or revenge;
and the risk of successful deception is not negligible.... Even the
woman who is quite sane, but who is possessed of strong guilt feelings,
may convince herself in retrospect that her own conduct was really
blameless and that she was forced.!
14
Weihofen went on to cite women's "ambivalent and confused
mixture of desire and fear," and to opine that "erotic pleasure" is
intertwined with "physical struggle." '3 5 He further argued that victim
behavior was often a "major contributing factor" to criminal homicide
as well.3"6 Not surprisingly, he concluded that women provoked some
of "the most famous wife-killings."3 '7 Other commentators expressed
similar views.3"' Early versions of VOCA reflected that same distrust.
For example, the Senate report on the 1973 version prohibited awards
to "a person maintaining continuing sexual relations with a principal or
accomplice.'"3 "
Of course, not all VOCA drafters held these views. However,
bias against domestic and sexual violence victims remains, and has
been widely documented. For example, in enacting the 1994 Violence
Against Women Act, Congress referenced two dozen studies by state
task forces concluding that crimes that disproportionately affect
women "are often treated less seriously than comparable crimes
affecting men."32' Subsequent reports confirm those conclusions. The
recent 2003 report of the Pennsylvania Committee on Racial and
Gender Bias identified ways in which court personnel continue to treat
survivors of domestic abuse in ways that were experienced as
313. Henry Weihofen, Compensation for Victims of Cri'ninal Violence: A
Roundtable, 8 J. PUB. L. 209,210-11 (1959).
314. Id. at 210.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 211.
317. Id. at 212.
318. See, e.g., Childres, supm note 133, at 273 (cautioning that "women yearning for
rape" might seek compensation) (emphasis added).
319. S.REP.No. 93-83,at6(1973).
320. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 & n.52 (1993) (listing studies); see also Jeannette F.
Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Erpirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 1, 55-58 (1996) (describing uniform task force conclusions
that "all reaches of the justice system" trivialize domestic violence, including police
reluctance to enforce protective orders, misperceptions of extent of violence, judicial
presumptions that the victim provoked or deserved the violence, and the perception that only
visible injuries are real).
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"demeaning," demonstrating a lack of understanding of the problem
and failure to take it seriously.3 21 Survivors' credibility is continually
scrutinized, and their reactions to the abuses viewed with skepticism.
3 22
Bias against victims of sexual assault is legendary as well. From the
historical view that rape "is an accusation easy to be made and hard to
be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so
innocent 3 23  to contemporary efforts to discredit complaining
witnesses,... victims of sexual assault still experience the justice system
as unwelcoming and even hostile, notwithstanding much progress and
reform.325
321. PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS INTTHE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, FINAL REPOtr 390, available at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/index/
supreme/biascmte/fmalreport.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
322. Id. at 396 (detailing ways in which court personnel misinterpret survivors'
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village judge resigned after he was accused of telling a victim of domestic violence that such
cases are "dragged out" and a "waste of the court's time," and telling a state trooper that most
women enjoy being abused and ask to get "smacked around." Editorial, Domestic Violence
StilNot Understooag OBSERVER-DISPATCH (Utica, N.Y), Jan. 12, 2004, at 7A.
323. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (1847).
324. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Consent Defense, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 1, 2003,
at 40 (documenting the history of rape reform in the context of efforts by NBA star Kobe
Bryant to discredit testimony of the witness who brought a complaint of sexual assault
against him).
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YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986) (exposing the myth that only rapes by strangers were "real"
rapes). Studies of the effectiveness of these reforms have concluded that they have modestly
increased victim reporting rates and offender incarceration, but that barriers in the criminal
justice system remain. See Bachman & Pastemoster, supra, at 573-74; see also, e.g., Kim
Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1095, 1096-1100 (1987)
(recounting limitations of legal reform and victims' enduring difficulties obtaining redress);
Cassia C. Spohn & Julie Homey, The Impact of Rape Law Reform on the Processing of
Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 861, 862-63 (1996)
(tracing rape law reforms and evaluating their impact on rates of arrest, prosecution,
conviction, and incarceration). Scholars have begun to identify unintended effects of reforms
that impede successful prosecution. See, e.g., Michele J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in
Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 1005-09 (1998) (arguing that elimination of the
resistance requirement hampers prosecutions in cases in which women did not consent and
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and ignored by law enforcement personnel. See, e.g., Mark Fazlollah, Nat'l Org. for Women,
Women Activists Monitor Philadelphia Rape Squag WOMEN'S ENEWS, at http://www.
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Those attitudes reflect formal and informal policies and practices
that long have barred relief. For example, tort immunity doctrines and
marital exemptions historically have prevented civil recovery, and their
legacy continues to bar civil suits.2 Beyond these formal barriers,
practices in which survivors are forced to expose their private lives and
intimate conduct to win a damage award operate to deter survivors
from filing suit.327 If government-supported compensation programs
can be seen as a mechanism to fill gaps produced by the failure of
existing systems to address victims' needs, they should go to lengths to
ensure participation and adequate compensation where, as here,
traditional systems fall short. Although the 9/11 Fund was devised
with a different purpose, its policies and procedures, designed to
ensure participation and meaningful compensation, exemplify the type
of approach a victim compensation program could take.
When viewed in tandem, many of the arguments that would
justify creating separate compensation systems for victims of terror
attacks and victims of domestic and sexual violence lose their force.
For example, an argument justifying different treatment based on the
number of people affected by the September 11 attacks becomes less
persuasive in light of the statistics detailing the pervasiveness of
domestic and sexual violence."8 Arguments can be made that the
September 1 1 victims suffered similar harm as a group, thereby
facilitating the process of determining the compensation to which they
were due. 29 Yet, even if the similarity of harm experienced by victims
2004) (recounting exposure of Philadelphia police department's misclassification and failure
to investigate sexual assault complaints).
326. See, e.g., KARP & KARP, supra note 277, §§ 1.16-1.20 (citing tort immunity
doctrines and current case law); Dalton, supra note 277, at 324-30; Wriggins, supra note 207,
at 129-33. Doctrines such as marital immunities continue to prevent married victims of
sexual assault from obtaining redress through the criminal justice system. See Michelle J.
Anderson, Marital Immunity Intimate Relationshtps, and Improper Inferences: A New Law
on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1516-54 (2003) (tracing the history
and status of marital immunities for sexual assault and proposing new law to eliminate them).
327. For example, Congress amassed a detailed record of the policies and practices
that operated to preclude victims of crimes such as domestic violence and sexual assault from
bringing suit when it enacted the 1994 Violence Against Women Act. See Amicus Brief of
Senator Joseph Biden for Appellant, at 1-4, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(Nos. 99-5, 99-29) (recounting legislative record of laws, policies and practices that create
barriers for women seeking redress for domestic and sexual violence). Congress identified
practices that cast doubt on the credibility of those filing claims for domestic and sexual
violence as one persistent barrier to justice. -d; see also Swent, supra note 320, at 55-70
(detailing further enduring practices that preclude redress for victims of domestic and sexual
violence).
328. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
20041
TULANE LA W REVIEW
of domestic and sexual violence is put to the side, compensation
programs are fully capable of assessing individualized harm. While
there may be something about the uniformity of many September 1 1
victims' experiences that facilitates determination of award amounts,
the 9/11 Fund still makes individualized assessments, for example, for
losses experienced by those who were injured as a result.33 The highly
public nature of the September 11 attacks and the perception of group
harm contrasts sharply with the ways in which domestic and sexual
violence traditionally have been relegated to the private sphere.33' To
the extent the response to the attacks was driven by a perception that
they inflicted a public harm against Americans as a group, the failure
to provide a similarly accessible compensation scheme for domestic
and sexual violence victims highlights our collective failure to
recognize the public and shared nature of this type of violence as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of when and to what extent the government should
participate in compensation programs for victims of violent crime is
difficult, compelling, and may be driven by political realities as much
as by social theory and empirical evidence. This comparison of the
government-supported compensation programs for victims of the
September 1 1 terror attacks with the programs for victims of domestic
and sexual violence reveals that the distinctions between the two
groups of victims is less stark than one might initially imagine, and
that the wide disparity in programmatic approach is not justified by the
difference in victim experience. This Article urges an invigorated
review of compensation programs for victims of these forms of
violence. It recommends that future programs be informed by the
realities of victims' experiences and be stripped of historic biases
against survivors of domestic and sexual violence. The September 11
attacks illustrate how victim compensation programs might be
approached in the absence of mistrust and bias. Extending the
compassion that provided the impetus for the 9/11 Fund to victims of
other crimes for whom traditional forms of recovery are unavailable
can go a long way toward advancing the critical goal of helping
330. ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 404(c)(2)(A), 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at
49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note (West Supp. 2004)); September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund
of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,242 (Mar. 13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.FR. § 104 (2003)).
331. See, e.g., THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (Martha A. Fineman &
Roxanne Mykituk eds., 1995); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence ofPivacy, 23 CONN. L.
REV. 973 (1991); Goldfarb, supm note 211, at 1-87.
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victims recover from the violence, and move on to safety and
independence.

